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 ABSTRACT 
 
This paper investigates whether there is a positive relationship between secrecy and 
cohesion – a proposition first made by Georg Simmel. More precisely, the study used 
the experimental method to investigate whether having members of a dyad share a 
secret with each other, increased cohesion in the dyad compared to a control. A 
hierarchical linear model was used to analyze the data.  An interaction effect was 
found between trust and secrecy, but the results are not conclusive. The paper reviews 
work on secrecy (paying particular attention to Simmel’s perspective), cohesion, and 
the mechanisms linking the two. It ends by suggesting improvements to the 
experimental design and some theoretical extensions of the current study.   
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PREFACE 
Does a condition of secrecy, a situation where 1) members of a group share 
information known only to them and 2) those group members are aware of this fact 
and 3) deliberately conceal the information from non-group members -  cause 
cohesion in the group to increase as a result, and if so, by what processes? The paper 
investigated this question using a controlled laboratory experiment.  
 The property of secrecy has been understudied and undertheorized. Yet secrecy 
forms a critical feature of the social structure that shapes human social behavior. The 
practice of concealing is as old as human civilization. It is carried out by individuals, 
groups, organizations, and states. And the process of holding a secret has certain 
effects on the structure all four. While the heart of the paper is the investigation of one 
such process – the impact of secrecy on cohesion; it will explore related issues in some 
depth. First, the paper will begin by reviewing how secrecy has been conceptualized 
and how it has been distinguished from close conceptual cousins such as privacy, 
anonymity, confidentiality, and deception. Second, the paper will review the literature 
on secrecy from diverse disciplines with a special focus on (a) the work of Georg 
Simmel and (b) how secrecy has been related to cohesion by various scholars. Third, 
the paper will review the literature on cohesion – how it has been conceptualized, 
measured, and what some of the relevant theoretical findings are. Fourth, it will 
discuss some mechanisms by which secrecy may increase cohesion. Fifth, the 
laboratory study will be presented discussing the set up, procedures, findings, and the 
meaning of the results. Sixth, the paper will discuss how the present study might be 
strengthened in respect to certain design elements such as stronger manipulation, 
better measurement; more confound checks, and sub-studies to test for specific 
mechanisms. Finally, it will conclude by identifying extensions and implications of 
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my study of secrecy for certain basic questions in social scientific theory and suggest 
applications to practical problems and policy.  
 The paper also includes an appendix that documents some of the scripts, 
instruments, and manipulation examples used in the study. Points deemed tangential to 
the main argument but important in other respects have been carefully footnoted. 
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WHAT SECRECY IS AND ISN’T 
Dimensions and Types of Secrecy and its Close Cousins  
 Secrecy involves the deliberate concealment of attitudes, beliefs, goals, 
information, emotions, behaviors/practices, objects, or identities from social actors 
who are believed to value such information. Let us unpack the definition. 1) The 
concealment has to be deliberate. If the concealment is accidental – such that 
something is kept from someone else, because “they never asked” it does not 
constitute secrecy. 2) At the heart of the concept is concealment, some information is 
obscured or hidden from view or (easy) access. 3) The information has to be perceived 
to be valued by other social actors such that its revelation is believed to result in non-
trivial consequences. This relationality makes the process social. We often don’t go 
around telling others what we had for breakfast, but such information will be of no 
consequence (in most cases) if it was revealed, even if we go out of our way to 
conceal it.  
 Concealment can be limited to an individual secret holder, who alone guards 
the secret or to group secrecy where the secret is socially shared within a group. As we 
shall see some scholars argue that these levels of analysis are governed by 
qualitatively different dynamics.   
 Furthermore, the objects of concealment (the attitudes, goals, beliefs, 
information, emotions, behaviors, or identities) create a variety of permutations of 
secrecy. For example one can have a society that is known to exist, but whose 
membership/identities are unknown (e.g. Ku Klux Klan,) or a society whose 
membership and identities are known but whose practices are unknown (e.g. Cornell’s 
Quill & Dagger and Sphinx Head secret societies1
                                                 
1 Quill & Dagger and Sphinx Head are two of the oldest secret societies at Cornell University. 
Members are inducted annually and the list is published in the Cornell Daily Sun, a student-run 
newspaper.  The societies existed at Cornell for 118 and 115 years respectively.  
), or a society whose existence, 
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membership, and practices are unknown. There is no theoretical intuition whether 
concealment operates differently on the different levels and with different objects. 
Maybe the concealment of identity is qualitatively different than the concealment of 
emotions.  
Concealment is not unique to the human species. Monkeys, chimpanzees and 
even lower order animals have been observed hiding food from one another (see 
Vander Wall 1990 for a nice review of concealment dynamics by non-human 
animals). However, such concealment is motivated by instrumental concerns – a 
squirrel might hide a nut from another squirrel so it can enjoy it at a future date. An 
ape might hide a fruit so it can exchange the fruit for a mating opportunity at a later 
time. What is unique to humans is the concealment of symbols for non-instrumental 
goals2
 Privacy and Confidentiality: Privacy is a close cousin of secrecy. Following 
the distinction drawn by Shils “Privacy is the voluntary withholding of information 
reinforced by a willing indifference. Secrecy is the compulsory withholding of 
. But secrecy is often confused with analogous concepts such as deception, 
anonymity, privacy and confidentiality and it is important to distinguish and relate it to 
such concepts. 
 Deception involves deliberate/willful misrepresentation. Secrecy is passive, no 
falsity is stated – information is simply not revealed. In fact one may not even know 
the secret exists. Deception also has an explicit negative moral connotation since the 
other party is tricked and in some way actively harmed.  
 Anonymity is the concealment of specific kind of information – one’s identity. 
One may conceive of it as a sub-type of secrecy. It is the performance of an action 
without attaching one’s identity to the action by hiding one’s identifying information 
by wearing a mask or withholding a name.  
                                                 
2 The social sharing of secrets may also be unique to humans.    
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knowledge, reinforced by the prospect of sanctions for disclosure”( Shils 1956:26). 
Privacy is information restricted to individuals, whereas secrecy may or may not be 
restricted to individuals. An alternative distinction based on the perceived morality of 
the information that is being concealed was proposed by Warren and Laslett (1977). 
Privacy is about information that is morally neutral or positive and secrecy is about 
information that is “negatively valued by the excluded audience” (Warren and Laslett 
1977:44). They erroneously claim to base this distinction on Simmel’s essay3. This 
will not be the distinction used here as no analytic traction is gained by bringing moral 
perception into the analysis. Instead I will follow Simmel’s point that “Secrecy is a 
universal sociological form, which, as such, has, nothing to do with the moral 
valuations of its contents.” (Simmel 1906:463). Confidentiality is roughly4
                                                 
3 In an astonishing display of poor scholarship Warren and Laslett (1977) misquote Simmel by 
improperly using and omitting ellipsis. They cite on p.44 Simmel to say “As Simmel states ‘The secret 
…. is the sociological  expression of moral badness.’ [1950,p.331]”. Upon checking the source, the full 
quote reads as follows “Among other things [italics added], the secret is also[italics added] the 
sociological expression of moral badness, although the facts contradict the classical phrase that nobody 
is bad enough to want in addition to appear bad.” The “among other things” refers to the preceding 
sentences. “On the other hand, although the secret has no immediate connection with evil, evil has an 
immediate connection with secrecy: the immoral hides itself for obvious reasons even where its 
contents meets with no social stigma as , for instance, in the case of certain sexual delinquencies. The 
intrinsically isolating effect of immorality as such, irrespective of all direction social repulsion, is real 
and important beyond the many alleged entanglements of an ethical and social kind.” With the proper 
context added it is hard to misinterpret what Simmel actually said, secrecy is not inherently about good 
or evil, though secrecy is often associated with the ethically negative.  
4 One difference between privacy and confidentiality, particularly favored in the context of 
Institutional Review Boards, is that privacy is a right of a subject to control his/her information. 
Confidentiality may refer to an after the fact process. If private data was collected, keeping it 
confidential means that a third party keeps it secure. 
 the same 
as privacy.  
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SECRECY AND CONCEALMENT: AN ANALYTIC LITERATURE REVIEW 
 Secrecy: The Problem Discovered 
 The idea that secrecy may form a distinct social structural relation is a fairly 
old one in sociology. It was first recognized by Georg Simmel in his seminal 1906 
essay in the American Journal of Sociology5 (Simmel 1906). In addition to this article 
Simmel’s work on secrecy is contained in a subsequent book Soziologie, 
Untersuchungen über die Formen der Vergesellchaftung6 (1908), large portions of 
which have been translated into English by Kurt Wolff (1964). (However, most of the 
secrecy section of the book 7 is coterminous with the AJS article). Recent scholarship 
has uncovered the possibility that Simmel’s interest in secrecy may have been related 
to the heavy burden of bearing his own personal secret8
 The “discovery of society” and the emergence of disciplines such as sociology 
has closely corresponded with the development of the key institutions of the modern 
industrial age (Collins and Makowsky 1998).  The task of early sociologists has been 
to theorize the massive changes that were occurring in their own lifetimes. It is in this 
context that secrecy was “discovered” as a focus of attention. Simmel notes that 
modernity brought the following paradox in the availability of information. In the 
preindustrial, agrarian society, secrets were harder to maintain on the community 
level, since such gemeinschaft societies were structured in such a way that everyone 
was in constant contact with everyone else. Modern industrial societies with their 
massive populations, anonymous dwellings in cities, and poor monitoring, have made 
. 
                                                 
5 American Journal of Sociology was then in its 11th year of publication, having been founded in 
1896. Simmel’s article was translated from German by Albion Small, editor-in-chief of AJS at the time 
and the founder of America’s first Department of Sociology at the University of Chicago.  
6 Translated approximately as Sociology: Investigations of the Forms of Sociation.  
7 Of particular interest are part IV, chapters 3-4.   
8 While being married, Simmel had an out of wedlock child with a lover. The existence of the child (a 
daughter) was something he was deeply ashamed of and kept secret.  (Swedberg & Reich 2009 - see 
footnote 5 for primary and secondary sources) 
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secret keeping easier. On the other hand, governments are making far more 
information open and accessible to the public than ever before. Simmel notes how 
information on taxation, various regulations, and statistics on spending were very 
difficult to obtain until recently (Simmel 1906:468-469). Therein lays the paradox of 
the modern age in respect to secrecy: more secrecy by individuals and less secrecy 
from formal institutions. Max Weber was more leery of the openness of modern 
institutions. He claims that “The concept of the ‘official secret’ is the specific 
invention of the bureaucracy, and nothing is so fanatically defended by the 
bureaucracy as this attitude…” (Weber et al 1991:233). As if responding to Simmel, 
he claims that “the official statistics of Prussia, in general, make public, only what 
cannot do any harm to the intentions of the power-wielding bureaucracy” (ibid). For 
Weber, secrecy is a key tool that bureaucracies use to maintain power; the modern 
increasingly bureaucratized age will be an increasingly secretive one.  
 While both Weber and Simmel wrote on the macro and meso aspects of 
secrecy, it was Simmel (1906) that most thoroughly explored the micro dynamics of 
secrecy.   
  
Simmel and Secrecy 
 Simmel begins with some basic facts about social relationships. Human 
relations, he notes, are predicated on knowing information about people with whom 
we interact and form various kinds of relationships. There is a desire/motivation to 
know accurate information about the other person. Even two previously unacquainted 
individuals, who may not expect to see each other again, form some mental image of 
one another. Relations involving trust with resources amplify this desire to know the 
other. Simmel points out that there is another dimension to human relations besides 
mutual knowledge via the desire to know the other, which paradoxically is mutual 
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concealment. While people have a desire to know about others, they also have an 
apprehension of letting everything be known about themselves. Thus emerges a kind 
of tug of war between trying to know and conceal, which is done with various degrees 
of subtlety in various human relations. This dynamic has many social psychological 
consequences.  
 Most people have an aversion to secrecy, particularly when it comes to secrecy 
maintained from them. Part of the genius of Simmel’s essay was to “naturalize” 
secrecy, as neither inherently good nor bad, but as another social process that is 
necessary for the conduct of human affairs, that thoroughly pervades modern 
institutions, but that is sometimes taken for granted. His 1906 paper is rich in 
numerous observations on secrecy, not always logically coherent and sometimes filled 
with tangential digressions. I will review some of the points most relevant in the 
context of this paper – the social psychological dynamics of secrecy, its consequences, 
and the mechanisms that produce these consequences.  
 Simmel observes that in the interpersonal realm, there is a natural inclination to 
pour one’s soul to one’s partner, but he notes full transparency is bad for personal 
relationships because some mystery and surprise is the fuel that keeps a relationship 
lasting (Simmel 1906:460). But more interesting is his rationale for the observation. 
Simmel claims that when we don’t know something about the other, it makes that 
person so much more alluring, we begin to fill in by imagination and this act of 
“filling in the mysterious” is more important for the relationship than knowing the 
actual truth. The process is further generalized apart from the realm of intimate 
partners and friends to other social relationships.  
Furthermore, Simmel argues that secret-keeping or concealment is a social 
process on two levels of organization. First it involves other persons from whom the 
secret is kept. The possibility that a secret may be revealed or betrayed creates anxiety 
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for the secret-keeper. Simmel claims that “secrecy is sustained by the consciousness 
that it might be exploited” (ibid:466).  Second, the secret need not be restricted to one 
person but may indeed be shared by multiple persons.  When secret-keeping or 
concealment is done by groups rather than individuals, the dynamics become more 
powerful.  Indeed, the practice of concealment underpins (to a lesser or greater extent) 
the behavior of many social institutions from small secret societies to nation states. 
Simmel goes on to suggest (or speculate) on how secrecy emerges, what function it 
plays, and appeals to numerous historical examples to illustrate his points. Given this 
paper’s theme, I will focus on the consequences that Simmel claims the property of 
secrecy has for small groups.   
 He notes several social psychological processes that occur as a result of small 
groups engaging in concealment: greater tendency to agree with each other, greater 
obedience to the leaders, diffusion of responsibility in one’s actions, and cohesion 
among members.   
 Simmel argues that having an aura of secrecy in a group makes members more 
susceptible to reach a consensus. He notes, in the context of political Cabinet 
discussions, that “… a small collection of people may be brought to agreement much 
more readily if their transactions are secret. (ibid:492)”. He attributes part of this to the 
fact that members are more isolated from countervailing influences. Though it is not 
clear from his discussion of whether it is isolation or secrecy (or their combination) 
that bring about the consensus. Presumably groups that are isolated but not secretive 
(e.g. a group of convicted sex offenders) will not reach consensus quicker. It appears 
that Simmel is arguing that isolation adds to the effect.  
  For Simmel, members of the secret society are also more likely to obey their 
own leaders and rules. He argues that, paradoxically, the more such a society is based 
on breaking outside laws (e.g. a criminal secret society) the more stringently they will 
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follow their own laws because there is a natural need for balance between freedom to 
do as one pleases and to following rules. Hence if you break laws in one domain, you 
will have an inclination to be submissive in another domain. “The excess of freedom, 
which such societies possessed with reference to all otherwise valid norms, had to be offset, 
for the sake of the equilibrium of interests, by a similar excess of submissiveness and 
resigning of the individual will.” (ibid).    
 Perhaps more intuitively, secrecy also allows for the abrogation of 
responsibility, letting people commit acts they would otherwise not be inclined to 
commit due to expected normative sanctions. For example one may never participate 
in sexual orgies or be part of a society that is known for engaging in sexual orgies, but 
belonging to a secret society that engages in sexual orgies and whose membership and 
activities are hence unknown to the public may make participation more likely. This 
extends to other activities such as murder. The wearing of masks or other disguises 
further loosens the constraint that one may otherwise feel. Simmel extends the idea to 
semi-public political groups that conduct their affairs in secret, citing the US House of 
Representatives as an example. “In the American House of Representatives the real 
conclusions are reached in the standing committees, and they are almost always ratified by the 
House. The transactions of these committees, however, are secret, and the most important 
portion of legislative activity is thus concealed from public view. This being the case, the 
political responsibility of the representatives seems to be largely wiped out, since no one can 
be made responsible for proceedings that cannot be observed” (ibid:496). 
 Simmel also suggests that secretive groups will tend to become centralized and 
develop strong authoritarian leaders. This is largely a function of survival. “Secret 
societies which, for whatever reasons, fail to develop a tightly solidifying authority 
are, therefore, typically exposed to very grave dangers” (Simmel 1964:371). This 
appears to be a functional, accidental property of secrecy. Secretive groups have very 
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high costs of defection, since very few defectors, can destroy the group. Simmel 
assumes that strong leadership is the best mechanism to prevent and control defection. 
This of course is a strong (though not unreasonable) assumption.  
 Finally, Simmel posits the relationship between secrecy and cohesion of the 
group, claiming that secrecy makes groups more solidary. He says that “… the 
intensified seclusion against the outside is associated with the intensification of 
cohesion internally…” (ibid:371).  Simmel points out that unlike legitimate societies, 
discord may sacrifice the group since an unhappy member can simply choose to betray 
everyone else’s identities and the group’s secret(s). This precariousness puts pressure 
to maintain good relations. In what may appear as the strongest claim of the essay he 
says:  
 
“Among all the bonds of an individual, the bonds of the secret sociation9
 In effect, one interpretation
 
always has an exceptional position. In comparison with it, the official [non-
secret] bonds – familial, civic, religious, economic, through rank, and 
friendship – no matter how varied their contents, touch contact surfaces on a 
very different kind and measure. Only the contrast with the secret societies 
makes it clear that their claims criss-cross one another, because they lie (so to 
speak) in the same plane. Since these claims openly compete for the 
individual’s strength and interests, individuals collide with any one of these 
circles: each individual is simultaneously claimed by the interests of other 
groups. The sociological isolation of the secret society greatly limits such 
collisions” (ibid:369).   
10
                                                 
9 Sociation (Vergesellschaftung) is a critical concept in Simmel’s work. It denotes something akin to a 
social relationship through a particular kind of interaction that forms society. For example economic 
sociatoins form the economy. Familial sociations form the family. Managers and worker sociations 
form hierarchical organizations.  
10 One can also interpret the passage to mean that secret societies make people sever ties such that 
other competing obligations disappear. However the context of the essay makes it clear that Simmel is 
talking about simulatenous membership in secret societies and ordinary society. One could be a Free 
Mason and be a husband, father, employee with competing obligations. For Simmel the Freemasonry 
obligation will triumph the other  three, should they come to conflict.  
 of this passage is that secret relations triumph 
over all others, such that role conflicts (e.g. mother on the one hand, employee on the 
other) are easily resolved in favor of the secret organization, if that is one of the 
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competing obligations. The individual looks at his/her membership in the secret 
society as a qualitatively different kind of obligation.  
 But why? What is it about the secret relation, irrespective of content, that 
elevates it above all others? Surely this is an extraordinary claim. Why is belonging to 
the Freemasons any different than belonging to the Rotary Club? What is the 
mechanism that makes secret societies so unique? For Simmel a critical mechanism is 
the so-called “aristocratizing motive” (ibid:365). He points to the basic process of 
forming any (non-instrumental) group where members seek to distinguish themselves 
from one another. The mere separation itself often has the effect of signaling value to 
the members and the non-members. “Even in school classes, it can be observed how 
small, closely integrated cliques of classmates think of themselves as the elite over 
against the others who are not organized – merely because of the formal fact of 
constituting a special group; and the others, through their hostility and envy, 
involuntary acknowledge this higher value” (ibid). Secrecy and mystification magnify 
this effect several-fold, giving it importance beyond other ordinary or non-secret 
groups.  
 Such an analysis raises the question of whether secrecy is just a less general 
status process. For reasons, explained later in the paper, it will be argued it is not. Now 
we will turn to some work on secrecy done in spite and despite of Simmel’s famous 
essay.  
 
Post-Simmelian Secretology 
After the publication of Simmel’s 1906 paper, studies of secrecy diverged in 
several directions. A number of sociologists have tried to build directly on his work 
and to clearly articulate the empirical propositions found in his AJS article and 
attempted to test them. Others have gestured at Simmel in the cursory manner that is 
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common when citing the sociological classics, when they tangentially bear on what 
one has to say. This later trend is, not surprisingly, more common and is evident even 
in non-sociological articles on secrecy such as those written by psychologists, 
anthropologists, and political scientists.   
The literature may be further subdivided on methodological grounds. There is 
a large tradition of archival studies of secret societies, of field studies especially by 
anthropologists, and a smaller tradition by experimentalists11
The sort of evidence Simmel presented for his sweeping claims was often 
illustrative rather than confirmatory. Simmel drew upon historical cases of various 
secret societies (often without citing a single source
.  
12
This is a route undertaken by several sociologists (I will mention some of the 
key studies without going into details, unless the study has a bearing on the secrecy-
cohesion relationship, given the space limitations of the paper). The first to try to do so 
was Hawthorn (1956) applying Simmel’s ideas to a small Canadian religious 
community, called the Doukhobors and a secretive sect within this group, called the 
). While he ignores negative 
cases that may disconfirm his empirical generalizations, Simmel manages to 
impressively span both history and geography in culling evidence to buttress his 
argument: the Illuminati (p.472); the German Communal associations (p.472), the 
natives of Molucca Islands (p.474); the Gallic Druids (p.475), and the ancient 
Pythogorians (p.475) are just some of the cases he cites. But it would be a mistake to 
dismiss his analysis and theoretical insights because the evidence is “shabby”. Instead 
a more promising route is to try to systematically and empirically assess his claims.  
                                                 
11 There is also some work that discusses secrecy that can be categorized as post-modern theorizing, 
but this body of literature will not be reviewed here.  
12 In Simmel’s defense this was the practice at the time, where academic articles resembled 
journalistic articles. The academic culture of citation and documentation  has not become universal and 
codified by scientific journals until the later half of the 20th century(Bazerman 1988). Indeed one can 
browse the early issues of AJS to see that virtually none of the articles have bibliographies and few 
systematically cite and document their sources.  
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Sons of Freedom. Hawthorne was involved in a study of the Doukhobors 
commissioned by the Canadian Government. He used some of the ethnographic data 
he and his colleagues collected to explore Simmel’s propositions in a detailed case 
study. Hawthorne concludes that some of the propositions are supported, some need to 
be qualified, while others may have to be rejected. None concern the relationship 
between secrecy and cohesion. Hazelrigg (1969) criticized Hawthorne’s interpretation 
of Simmel and postulated his own nine propositions that could be empirically tested 
(though he does not do so himself). Again none concern the relationship between 
secrecy and cohesion, which is not contested. Erickson (1981) considered some 
propositions in respect to the structure of secret societies claimed by Simmel, using a 
detailed comparative study of six secret societies that are under risk (as they are 
engaged in illicit activities), arguing that risk is a critical property when considering 
secrecy as it ads to new pressures in organizing group activities.  
Other studies by ethnographers and anthropologists examined issues such as 
how concealment practices develop,  how secretive knowledge is revealed, the 
practice of esotericism among pre-literate societies, as well as the various nuances in 
the “discourse of secrecy” (George 1993; Tefft 1980; Ulin 1986). It is worth noting 
that these studies raise questions regarding just how much secrecy is characteristic of 
modern societies. The folk view of pre-modern societies is that of harmony, 
egalitarianism, and openness. This view has been increasingly modified by 
anthropologists, uncovering both formal and informal status hierarchies among pre-
literate peoples.  A substantial number of pre-modern societies practice the guarding 
of certain kinds of knowledge within their tribal community such that only the elite 
few get to know the “truth”; and while there are secrets within a sub-section of a tribe, 
there are also secrets that the tribe maintains from other tribes ((George 1993; George 
1993; Murphy 1980; Piot 1993). These studies suggest that secrecy is not a feature of 
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the industrial age, of the need to manage large populations, or of the coming age of 
bureaucracy; instead it has been practiced since the dawn of humanity. A lot of this 
ethnogrpahic literature is heavily descriptive and few articles bear on the question of 
secret-keeping and cohesion. The one exception is by sociologists Gary Fine and Lori 
Holyfield (1996)who examine the role of secrecy in the context of a recreational 
mushroom picking society in Minnesota.   
Fine and Holyfield argue that trust and secrecy can be critical conditions in 
creating cohesion for members of non-instrumental, voluntary organizations. 
Mushroom picking groups depend on a large level of trust for accurate information 
since members often eat the collected mushrooms and consult with senior experts 
about the mushroom’s edibility. Some of the mushrooms collected are poisonous and 
occasionally cause death when consumed, so there is a degree of danger and risk in the 
activity as well as considerable stakes in accurate information. On the other hand there 
is a norm of secrecy about casually revealing the locations of the mushroom spots. 
However secrets are revealed in various forms, to various members, to various extents, 
and almost everyone participates.  “The telling of secrets on certain occasions builds 
community among members: when enough members privately communicate secrets, 
everyone eventually becomes a holder, a giver, and a recipient of secrets” Fine & 
Holyfield 1996:30. Of course this is an ethnographic study, none of the variables are 
measured, there are no controls, and the study does not rule out other alternative 
explanations. Perhaps secrecy is epiphenomenal to trust or maybe it is the exchange of 
information rather than secrecy per se, or even some other factor that contributes to 
cohesion. Furthermore how can we know for sure that there is an increase in cohesion? 
Fine and Holyfield observe a qualitative “belongingness” or “we-ness” and label it 
cohesion among their participants, but is this really cohesion they are observing?  
Even if there is a relationship between secrecy and cohesion, how do we know that the 
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causal arrow is not reversed – maybe cohesive groups are more likely to trust one 
another and hence to share secrets? Both authors come from the ethnographic tradition 
of sociology and despite the shortcomings; the study has a great deal of face validity 
and proposes many interesting ideas.  
However, there have been efforts to examine the relationship between cohesion 
and secrecy more scientifically, under controlled conditions to rule out alternative 
explanations and by operationalzing the variables involved. Interestingly, Simmel’s 
1906 essay was favorably reviewed in Psychological Bulletin (Hornstein 1906) (a top 
journal in psychology at the time) of that year. The first study on secrecy and 
cohesion13
To simplify the design for summary purposes, the experiment involved the 
following. Subjects who were previously unacquainted were assembled in groups of 
four, further subdivided along mixed-sex couples. They were then seated at a table and 
instructed to play a card game. In the experimental portion of the study, one pair of the 
subjects was instructed to play footsie under the table without the other couple 
knowing
 in experimental psychology was by Wegner, Lane, Dimitri (1994). 
Technically the dependent variable was not strictly cohesion, but interpersonal 
attraction, though it is suggestive for cohesion.  
14
                                                 
13 This was not the first study on secrecy per se as there are a number of research programs involved 
in the study of concealment, stigma, self-revelation and hiding. See (Collins and Miller 1994; Cozby 
1973). 
14 I am oversimplifying the study for exposition purposes. Wegner and colleagues administered  initial 
scales of liking (before the introduction), conducted manipulation checks, and had other controls. 
Interested readers are urged to consult the original protocol of the study.  
. In the control condition the other pair was aware of the other couple’s 
footsie game. The experiment was a between-group design. The couple was then given 
a scale on interpersonal attraction. The secret condition group had sizable effects on 
interpersonal attraction (regardless of sex).  
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Foster and Campbell (2005) questioned the Wegner et al (1994) findings, 
arguing that while secrecy may make strangers appear attractive to one another; it 
interferes with actual ongoing relationships over the long-run, by putting various 
stressors on them (e.g. worrying about being discovered, not being able to visit certain 
meeting places, not being able to confide to friends and gain social support). 
Furthermore, they argued that while the appearance of attractiveness that Wegnet et al 
(1994) demonstrated was real; the effect would be only temporary and would 
disappear in long-term relationships. Over three studies they administered secrecy and 
attractiveness vignettes to persons involved in either secret or open relationships for at 
least two months and found secret relationships to be less satisfying, more likely to be 
associated with breakup, and to be viewed as more burdensome.  
There is another experimental study by a sociological social psychologist that 
purportedly examined secrecy and cohesion that is worth mentioning. However, a 
closer examination reveals that secrecy was not really the independent variable 
manipulated.  Bonacich (1976) considered whether groups engaged in a Prisoners 
Dilemma15
                                                 
15  The game was not strictly a Prisoners Dilemma.  
 game are more likely to sanction non-cooperators if the non-cooperator is 
unknown to the rest of the group. It was suspected that when there is a severe conflict 
between group interests and individual interests (as in a PD), groups will be more 
likely to develop stronger solidarity norms and appeal to normative sanctions to deter 
greed. However, while Bonacich uses the term secrecy, this is not strictly speaking a 
Simmelian type of secrecy. The experimental design is such that groups either know 
the defector or don’t. It can be more accurately described (not as secrecy but) as 
general anonymity or presence vs absence of information. The non-contributor is 
either known by everyone or not known by everyone. If the experiment was set up 
such that there was a group of non-contributors who were known only to themselves, 
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one can argue that this would be an instance of secrecy. If party A is interacting 
(loosely defined) with party B; secrecy requires that A know the secret (which B 
would like to have revealed) and/or that B know that A knows the secret and is aware 
that B wants to have it revealed.  The experimenter is not that party since s/he is part 
of the situational set up.  
Finally, there is a number of research programs that have relied on Simmel’s 
secrecy essay that are worth pointing out. Studies of state secrecy (Shils 1956), 
security and classification systems (Lowry 1972; Rigney 1979) and organizational and 
business secrecy have drawn explicity on Simmel (Andersen 1980:205-228; 
O’Connell 1979).  
Gary Marx and Glenn Muschert (2008) have called for a “sociology of 
information” with a “particular emphasis on the structures, processes and 
consequences of several types of information control in various substantive contexts 
and structural settings” (p.2) There are studies of concealment and self-disclosure of 
particular pieces of information (Collins and Miller 1994; Cozby 1973) and personal 
identity (Suedfeld 2004). Studies of the role of anonymity in exchange (Andreoni and 
Petrie 2004; Haley and Fessler 2005) . Finally studies of secret societies of past and 
present have used some of Simmels ideas on secrecy (Chen 2004; Clawson 1985; Ulin 
1986) 
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COHESION: CONCEPTUALIZATIONS, MEASUREMENTS, AND 
THEORETICAL INSIGHTS 
The experimental study of cohesion is a lot more persistent and systematic than 
the study of secrecy. Indeed, the concept enjoys a kind of “embarrassment of riches”.  
There is so much work on cohesion from so many different research programs, that 
there is no consensus on what the concept entails (and does not entail). I will briefly 
review some of the directions in conceptualizing this construct with a special focus on 
the conceptualization that is used in this paper. There are a number of excellent 
reviews by sociologists, psychologists, and organizational scholars of this literature 
(Casey-Campbell and Martens 2009; Dion 2000; Friedkin 2004; Mudrack 1989; 
Siebold 1999).  
 Cohesion (also referred to as cohesiveness and solidarity16
                                                 
16 While cohesion and solidarity are generally used interchangeably in the literature, some scholars, 
notably (Willer, Borch and Willer 2002) distinguish between the two terms; cohesion is defined as the 
extent to which group members stick together and solidarity is defined as the extent to which group 
members produce collective goods to their mutual advantage.  Thus a group can have cohesion, 
according to their account, but not solidarity.  
) has aroused 
interest and contributions from sociologists, psychologists, anthropologists, and the 
specialized areas of military, organizational, and sports psychology. This is not 
surprising, as the question of why groups, organizations, and societies “stick together” 
seems fundamental to many research domains. Indeed on its face, most people have an 
intuitive understanding of roughly what cohesion refers to. However, a number of 
knotty problems arise once one thinks more carefully and deeply about what cohesion 
really means. Is cohesion: a property of individuals or of groups; is it a unitary concept 
or does it have multiple dimensions; is it a behavior or an attitude; is it an objective 
feature of a group or a subjective sense of its members; should it be measured by its 
causes or by its consequences; how does it relate to similar concepts like morale, 
interpersonal attraction, or liking.  
18 
 
The first approximations of cohesion conceptualized it as “the total field of 
forces which act on members to remain in the group” (Festinger 1950:37). The “total 
field of forces” referred to the positive force acting to contribute to cohesion minus the 
negative forces unraveling it. The next shift occurred in the wake of the popularity of 
factor analytic methodology. Researcher began to uncover independent dimensions of 
items associated with cohesion. An important distinction between vertical and 
horizontal cohesion was introduced by military psychologists (Griffith 1988; Siebold 
1999). While horizontal cohesion is very similar to interpersonal cohesion between 
status equals in a group, vertical cohesion refers to the perception by subordinates of 
the competence of the superior. This work provided the insight that in hierarchical 
groups, it is not enough to consider cohesion between status equals, as cohesion 
between formal or informal leaders is also critical. Another distinction was suggested 
by Brawley, Carron, and Widmeyer (1988) and separately by Zaccaro and Lowe 
(1988) distinguishing between task cohesion and social cohesion. Task cohesion refers 
to the instrumental task performance or the liking of belonging to the group because of 
the activity the group is engaged in and social cohesion refers to the more traditional 
interpersonal cohesion.  
 A long-standing debate is whether cohesion is the additive property of 
individuals – that is a group’s cohesion is nothing more than the sum (or mean) of the 
cognitive interpersonal attraction of its members to each other or whether cohesion is 
an emergent property of the relations between members that should be measured on 
the group level only and cannot be reduced to the constituent individuals (in any direct 
sense)17
                                                 
17 Moody and White (2003) distinguish between ideational (actor-centered cognitive) and relational 
components of cohesion. I don’t quite think this is the most precise way to carve this up since 
technically relational dimensions incorporate some aspects of ideational cohesion. I think the most 
precise way of formulating the distinction comes down to whether cohesion is an additive or an 
emergent property.  
. Instead network characteristics such as transitivity, tie density or reachability 
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should be considered (for a review of this literature see Moody & White (2003) and 
Markovsky & Lawler (1994).  Lawler and Yoon (1996) argued that frequent positive 
exchange between actors that produce positive affect for the two parties may cause the 
two parties to view the relational tie between them as an object in itself. Individuals 
therefore develop attitudes to the relationship itself as much as to the other individuals 
these relationships involve. This is, in my opinion, one of the most creative insights in 
cohesion theory. 
The social identity approach introduced yet another wrinkle to the debate.  The 
proposition made by SIT is that groups are perceived by individuals not as the sum 
elements of their parts but as objects in themselves, such that it is possible that a 
person may not feel much interpersonal attraction to the members of the group but feel 
interpersonal attraction to the group itself. Social identity theorists argued that 
cohesion was a function of group prototypicality –one felt cohesive with the group to 
the extent that one shared salient traits with members of the group. One of the early 
findings was that besides socially/culturally salient traits (e.g. race, gender, religion), 
nominal traits like sharing some arbitrary group name would be sufficient (Hogg 
1992).   
Another direction in conceptualizing cohesion is whether it should be 
measured by examining some objective measure of the group such as mean cohesion 
scores, a sociometric index, the number and intensity of network ties, or the perceived 
attitudinal cohesion of each member.  This is the direction that two sociological social 
psychologists, Kenneth Bollen and Rick Hoyle (1990) have taken. After reviewing the 
debates in the cohesion literature they proposed that an emphasis on the perception of 
cohesion has not been adequately considered. “Perceived cohesion encompasses an 
individual's sense of belonging to a particular group and his or her feelings of morale 
associated with membership in the group. Perceived cohesion is an attribute of 
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individuals in a group that reflects an appraisal of their own relationship to the group.” 
(ibid: p.482.)  This appraisal is constituted by both cognitive and affective elements. 
The cognitive level includes memories of experiences with the group and individual 
members. This is manifested in a sense of belonging. The affective component 
includes the feelings that a person experiences toward the group and the individual 
members. This is manifested in a feeling of morale. The cognitive element provides 
information such as “I consider myself a member of this group” and the affective 
element provides the motivation to positively evaluate one’s membership in the group 
such as “I feel good about being in this group”. Both dimensions are critical to 
capturing the property of cohesion18
Bollen and Hoyle (1990) then proceeded to validate the concept by testing it in 
different kinds of groups and found that the “Perceived Cohesion Scale suggests that it 
has indicators with high reliability, validity, and some degree of invariance in different 
groups” (p.500). The metric has gained considerable popularity among researchers. 
While the first study used relatively large groups such as city residents and college 
students, a successful effort was made by Chin & Salisbury (1999) to adapt and test 
the scale in small groups of 4-7 each. The PCS has since been relatively widely used 
by both psychological and sociological social psychologists as well as scholars of 
organizational behavior. In his review of the cohesion literature Dion concludes by 
saying “The PCS may qualify as a general and broadly applicable measure of 
cohesion, one useful both for small, interacting groups and larger ones in which 
.  
                                                 
18 Interestingly, these two dimensions are consistent with Lawler, Thye, and Yoon’s (2000) 
endogenous mechanisms that lead to relational commitment. Indeed the authors themselves point to this 
parallel with Bollen and Hoyle’s perceived cohesion scale. They say “One endogenous path operates 
through the uncertainty reduction effects of exchange frequency, and the second endogenous path 
operates through the emotional/affective effects of exchange frequency. These two processes converge 
in that each enhances perceptions that the group is a unifying or cohesive unit (see also Bollen and 
Hoyle 1990).” (ibid: 628) 
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members know some, but not all, of the members” (Dion 2000:21). This is the scale I 
will use in this study.  
The space limitations of this review prohibit considering other nuances in the 
cohesion literature that are less relevant to the current study. However, a voluminous 
literature exists on the topic. 19
                                                 
19 A large body of work exists in linking the cohesion mechanisms in small groups to cohesion in 
society. However, whether the answer to the question of what makes small groups solidary is the same 
to the question of what makes large societies solidary, is itself an open question. Within this literature 
there are sometimes strong theoretical distinctions.  Some scholars emphasize the exchange element in 
the production of cohesion (Cook and Emerson 1987; Ekeh 1974; Emerson 1976; Lawler 2001). A 
related program of rational choice analysis of cohesion has emerged, that conceptualizes cohesion as the 
compliance to group norms in the absence of material compensation for such compliance (Hechter 
1987:10).  This has been proposed as reactions to structuralist and normativist accounts of cohesion (see 
ch1 of Hechter 1987). Finally, there is important work in identifying the relationship of cohesion with 
cognate processes such as commitment, morale, group longevity, resistance to attrition, cooperation , 
collaboration, and altruism, group identification, sense of belonging, and trust (Austin and Worchel 
1979; Baumeister and Leary 1995; Cook;Hardin and Levi 2005; Hogg 1992; Kanter 1972; Zander 
1979), as well as larger questions of societal order (Durkheim and Halls 1984; Elster 1989; 
Lawler;Thye and Yoon 2009; Wrong 1994)   
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FROM SECRECY TO COHESION: CAUSAL MECHANISMS 
But what are the mechanisms by which secrecy generates cohesion and is 
secrecy doing the causal work? In this section I will consider such questions. In 
particular I will examine the two mechanisms suggested in Simmel the “aristocratic 
motive” and the “allure of the mysterious”, the possible explanatory power of status 
and trust (separately), obsessive preoccupation, social identity, associative learning, 
social exchange, affective effects, as well as less plausible mechanisms such as 
psychological reactance, cognitive dissonance, and the need for uniqueness.  
  
The Aristocratic Motive  
The first mechanism to consider is the one that Simmel offers, which is the so-
called aristocratic motive (Simmel 1964:364). Simmel says that “the secret” and “the 
mysterious” have a certain psychological allure for the secret-keeper. He points out 
that this starts from early age of human development and continues into adulthood.  
“Among children a pride and self-glory often bases itself on the fact that one can say 
to the others: ‘I know something that you don’t know.’ This is carried to such a degree 
that it becomes a formal means of swaggering on the one hand, and of de-classing on 
the other. This occurs even when it is a pure fiction, and no secret exists. From the 
narrowest to the widest relations, there are exhibitions of this jealousy of knowing 
something that is concealed from others” (Simmel 1906:462).  The notion that 
concealment and uncertainty can increase the subjective value of an object, a person, 
or a relationship is a critical insight of Simmel’s. Sharing a secret self-signals 
exclusivity - ennobles the person of having something valuable that others don’t have.  
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The Allure of the Mysterious 
 One might further ask, what is it about concealed information that makes it so 
alluring? This is a difficult question. There is a seeming irrationality in the idea that 
because something is complex, incomprehensible, uncertain, and ambiguous one must 
increase one’s commitment rather than lesson it. This is especially true for 
scientifically-oriented academics that live by the idea of evidence, consistency, and 
clarity as the paragons of worth when evaluating ideas and beliefs. However, there is a 
tradition in the West and other cultures of mysticism and obscurantism – that the most 
worthy ideas are the mysterious ones, the ones that defy common sense. The religious 
traditions of the three major religions have mystical branches that survived into 
modernity (e.g. Kabbalah in Judaism, Christian Mysticism in Christianity, and Suffism 
in Islam)20
 An interesting point from Simmel on this is that he notes that the effect of 
secrecy gets magnified when there is an active effort to puncture that secrecy. Simmel 
says that “the intention of the concealment assumes, however, a quite different 
. There is evidence that all kinds of esoteric practices have survived and 
even flourished in modern times (Tiryakian 1972). For the mystical traditions the truth 
is not in the rational or the plane but in the paradoxical, the sublime, the subtle, the 
indirect, the puzzling, and sometimes even in the contradictory. Some would even 
claim that this trend exists in the various humanities departments on campus (e.g. a la 
Sokel Hoax). Regardless, the mechanism proposed is that the secret is alluring because 
it is mysterious. Note that this mechanism suggests that it is not the information itself 
that is generating the effect, for if the information was revealed, it would be worthless 
– it is the very property of being secret and mysterious that makes the information 
alluring. Sharing a secret with someone signals access to this privileged information.   
                                                 
20 Some smaller religions are entirely obscurantist, for example the Druze as well as certain animist 
religions in Africa and Latin America.  
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intensity as soon as it is confronted by a purpose of discovery” (ibid:462). The demand 
for the information adds value to the secret.     
 There may be a connection to self-esteem such that one increases their self-
esteem by being above the rest of society, by going beyond the mundane and what 
everyone is doing and following.  Modern society emphasizes logic, consistency, and 
evidence – this becomes the mundane. Perhaps people that seek exclusivity and 
distinctness will reject those norms – not because they oppose those norms but 
because they are associated with the normal, average, and mundane. Being one of the 
few who knows the secret (regardless of content) perhaps taps into this desire.  
   
The Status Mechanism 
 But maybe secrecy is nothing more than an instance of status. To share a secret 
and be “in the know” is just to share high status. Those who possess the secret are the 
high-status group and those who don’t are the low-status group. Indeed secret-holding 
may appear like status holding – both appear as processes where holding some kind of 
resource allows one to increase one’s power, prestige, and wealth (Berger, Rosenholtz, 
and Zelditch Jr 1980). Both share the property of being exaggerated when threatened. 
However, there are a number of reasons to doubt the notion that the two are identical.  
 First, one of the key properties of status is its mutual recognition. Status 
processes, for instance those involving gender, race, or resource wealth, rest on the 
fact that others must recognize that one is a high status person in order to defer to them 
(Berger, Cohen and Zelditch Jr 1966:29-46; Berger, Cohen, and Zelditch Jr 1972). 
Status then is a relational property between the low and high status persons. Secrecy 
on the other hand operates (or can operate) on the premise that only one party knows. 
That is “I know something most people don’t and others don’t know that I know”. 
Secrecy has this perverse effect that it is precisely the fact that others don’t know that 
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you are a high status person, that you maintain your status. They may not defer to you 
in interactions and treat you like an ordinary person. The thought of “if they only 
knew who I am or what I know” is what allows you to keep the secret. To understand 
this it is helpful to consider the anonymous philanthropist. Take the case of an 
anonymous donor who along with her husband just bequeathed a large gift to a 
university. Maybe the couple is taking a stroll around campus, no press is following 
them, no students turn in admiration, no plaques or honors are conferred upon them, 
no building bears their name. In fact students and campus administrators pass by and 
treat them as just another elderly couple visiting the campus21
 The sufficiency of private knowledge and the sufficiency of private resources 
isolates secrecy from theories used to account for status emergence that are dependent 
on public knowledge and public resources. For example one cannot have an 
expectation state if there is no knowledge of who the high status person is by the other 
. They alone know the 
secret, and it is this knowledge that they know and other don’t, that binds them.  Status 
is not the operator here.  
  Second, secrecy may not be connected to any resources (e.g. knowing the way 
to manufacture a highly demanded good or knowing information that can be used to 
blackmail some powerful actor). Religious secrets or fraternalistic secrets regarding 
traditions and rituals of secret societies don’t provide any direct societal resources. A 
soldier who is part of an elite secret unit may never gain the glory that his compatriot 
in the open unit will gain.  One can certainly argue that the resources are individual 
(e.g. self-esteem, pride, personal satisfaction) or intra-group (solidarity among the 
secret members) but this is a sharp break with social resources.   
                                                 
21 Another example of this is a much noted practice among some monarchs of Europe and the Middle 
East to disguise themselves as commoners and walk the streets of their realms (Suedfeld 2004).  
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party and power and prestige are not allocated based on one’s occupation of high 
status.   
 
The Trust Mechanism 
The other candidate for an alternative explanation is trust. Perhaps trust is 
doing all the causal work. The trust mechanism would work like this. The act of 
sharing a risky secret authentically signals trust and trust is what creates the feeling of 
cohesiveness. The fact that one’s compatriots keep the secret and don’t give it up and 
one knows that they know, is what creates the unity. The fact that one does not give up 
their friend even though one could and that one’s friends observe the same 
phenomenon creates a self-reinforcing loop, which reinforces cohesion. Probably the 
effect is more pronounced when a prisoner’s dilemma game is played such that 
temptation does not result in defection and one would feel guilty defecting. Simmel 
actually notes (p.470) the role of reciprocal confidence between members of secret 
societies, the fact that members know that others depend upon them and trust them – 
makes the secret stronger.  
However, I doubt that trust is the whole story. Instead it is more likely that 
trust plays a moderator role in the effect. It is hard to imagine the sharing of secrecy 
without simultaneously sharing trust or sending a signal to the person that one trusts 
them.  Secrecy is likely to significantly enhance trust compared to a situation when 
trust is not based on anything secret. An experimental design to test this proposition 
will be suggested in the Experimental Extensions section.  
 
The Obsessive Preoccupation Mechanism 
 This is a mechanism studied extensively by Daniel Wegner and colleagues 
(Lane and Wegner 1995; Wegner, Erber, and Zanakos 1993; Wegner, Lane, and 
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Dimitri 1994). The classic illustration is the white bear phenomenon. When subjects 
are asked not to think of a white bear, they inevitably think of a white bear.  What 
happens is the following. Ironically, telling yourself  “don’t think of a white bear” 
activates the category “white bear”, which in turn recalls the image. The harder you 
tell it to yourself the more vivid the picture becomes. This mechanism relates to 
secrecy in the following way.  A person who holds a secret must ruminate and monitor 
themselves about the secret to not reveal it.  “The secret must be remembered, or it 
might be told. And the secret cannot be thought about, or it might be leaked” (Wegner, 
Lane, and Dimitri 1994:288) But how does this lead to cohesion? Wegner references a 
sizable number of psychological studies that link obsessive preoccupation with 
attraction – rumination about an object causes attraction to that object. The step from 
interpersonal attraction to cohesion is relatively small since some scholars define 
cohesion as interpersonal attraction. Being a member of a secret group causes one to 
obsess about protecting that secrecy, which in turn causes one to feel attracted to the 
group.  
 
The Ingroup/Outgroup Identity Mechanism  
  Another possible mechanism is that of social identity (Tajfel 1978; Tajfel 
1981). Sharing a secret among a group of people signals a boundary between an 
ingroup (possessors of the secret) and an outgroup (those who don’t know the secret). 
Secrecy in this account is merely a demarcator of ingroup/outgrouop boundaries. One 
of the claims of social identity theory is that the ingroup experiences greater cohesion 
among its members simply by virtue of sharing an attribute (ibid). As mentioned 
earlier, social identity theorists have documented even trivial attributes contributing to 
cohesion, so secrecy may plausibly do the same.  
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The Associative Learning Mechanism 
This is a particularly clever idea discussed as an alternative explanation in 
Wegner et al (1994:289). The notion is that there is a much simpler explanation for 
why secrets are more appealing. The secret in most cultures, and certainly in our 
modern culture is associated with “something sordid or unseemly”. Stories broadcast 
over the news media about a secret money laundering ring, or a secret bank account, 
or secret affair make the word secret becomes associated with something exotic, even 
if the secret may be intrinsically trivial. A person thinking they share a secret may 
unconsciously value the item because of this connotation.   
 
The Exchange Mechanism 
 We can combine certain insights from exchange theory (Blau 1967; Cook and 
Emerson 1987; Emerson 1976) and rational choice theory of group solidarity (Hechter 
1987). The mechanism involves the following reasoning. When two people share a 
secret there is an implicit exchange – “If you don’t betray, I won’t betray”. If the 
secret is consequential for both (e.g. an extreme example is murder) both face 
consequences if it is discovered. Therefore there exists a dependence of each on the 
other. This of course is also true of more mundane things such as some secret rituals or 
membership. If the rituals or the membership are betrayed and made public, the 
society ceases to exist. In this sense there is an interdependence of members. To the 
extent that participating in secret rituals and the pleasure from knowing that one keeps 
information that is a secret, the members are producing and consuming a joint good.  
One might consider that the more secrets one is exposed to the greater the dependence 
becomes.  Monitoring for signs of betrayal and sanctioning of unfaithfulness becomes 
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critical given the increased risk. This in turn produces greater solidarity (see Hechter 
1987)22
The Affect Mechanism 
.   
 
Another possible mechanism by which secrecy produces cohesion was 
suggested by Gary Fine (Fine and Holyfield 1996). He aptly point out that sharing a 
secret from the outgroup is seen as a fun game. “Secrecy, though it appears to be 
centrifugal, binds members together in providing for friendly competition-an arena of 
fun, reflected in narrative.” One can further adapt Lawler’s Affective Exchange 
Theory to argue that the implicit exchange of the secrets (noted above) creates positive 
affect, which in turn, increases cohesion (Lawler and Yoon 1996). This seems highly 
plausible – there is something fun in hiding things (e.g. there are lots of games where 
the object of the game is to hide yourself or some object) and doing this in a team 
manner  can heighten the excitement and the positive affect involved.  
 
Other Less Plausible Mechanisms 
The Psychological Reactance Mechanism 
This mechanism involves the idea that forbidding something may actually 
make someone want it and positively evaluate it. If you restrict a person’s freedom 
along a particular dimension, some people will react by developing positive attitudes 
toward the restricted item (See Brehm and Brehm 1981). This resembles the 
“forbidden fruit” argument that a small portion of illegal drug users try and continue 
using for no other reason that it being prohibited by society. Secrets that others are 
                                                 
22 Here there is a slight shift to Hechter’s definition of solidarity as voluntary compliance to norms, 
instead of cognitive and affective dimensions of cohesion I stressed earlier.  
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trying to penetrate may work the same way – one feels the attraction to the secret for 
no other reason than that it is concealed.   
 
The Cognitive Dissonance Mechanism 
Demanding tasks that are highly costly can be evaluated more positively due to 
cognitive dissonance (Festinger 1962; 1957). One is conscious that s/he is doing the 
task, which is perceived as important, the task is unpleasant, to balance the negative 
attitudes (the task I am doing is important, the task I am doing is unpleasant) the 
person re-assigns the valence of the task to “positive” (the task I am doing is pleasant).   
To the extent that keeping a secret is costly – one must constantly monitor oneself for 
disclosure, one may come to view the secret itself as favorable.   
 
The Need for Uniqueness Mechanism 
Uniqueness theory proposed by (Snyder and Fromkin 1980) is an extension of 
Festinger’s social comparison theory. They argue that people constantly compare 
themselves with others and look not just for similarities but also for differences. 
Human beings engage in a search for distinctiveness and this is especially the case 
when that need is threatened (e.g. one finds out that all one’s colleagues are listening 
to Diana Krall as well, so s/he begins to explore different musical artists). Satisfying 
the need for uniqueness from others is claimed to contribute to self-esteem. Sharing a 
secret may in effect contribute to satisfying one’s need for uniqueness since so few 
people know of the content of the secret.  
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EXPERIMENTAL STUDY 
To test the relationship between secrecy and cohesion I conducted an 
experimental study. The study was largely an existence proof; it was the first 
experimental study trying to establish whether sharing a secret increases cohesion in 
dyads (the Wegner study mentioned earlier involved interpersonal attraction between 
singletons). While the study was designed to rule out some mechanisms, its purpose 
was not to hone in on the exact mechanism that produces secrecy, though extensions 
of the study will be considered in the “Future Extensions” part of the paper.  
 
Participants 
The experiment involved a two condition design with 112 participants in total, 
with 56 participants in each condition23. Participants were recruited from sociology 
and psychology undergraduate courses and were offered either financial incentives ($5 
and up to $1 for the point allocations task24
                                                 
23 The original number of participants was 134. Some participants were excluded because they did not 
meet the theoretical conditions of the study. For example in a large number of instances the individuals 
came as friends or admitted during debriefing to being friends with their own or the other group’s 
members. This of course introduces a high baseline level of cohesion into the experiment prior to the 
actual manipulation. Such individuals were excluded irrespective to their scores on the dependent 
measures. Some individuals were aware of the hypothesis because they were alerted to it by classmates. 
Some were familiar with the Klee-Kaninsky paintings and did not believe their group assignment. 
Unfortunately because the tasks involved dyads, I had to exclude the entire dyad if one of the members 
knew the real set up of the experiment. Only one dyad or two participants were excluded for statistical 
reasons. One of the persons scored an extremely low score on the cohesion scale, three standard 
deviations below the mean. The score was also influential. We took notes on all the participants and 
nothing unusual was noted regarding this particular individual. It is not clear why such a low score was 
obtained.   
24 Subjects were given the full sum of $1 for the points allocations, regardless of actual point 
allocations.  
) or extra credit in their courses. The 
method of recruitment involved giving announcements in classes, posting printed 
advertisements around campus, and electronic postings on the online-managed 
recruitment system SUSAN, where students register after hearing about the research 
opportunity. The study was advertised to be about how artistic preferences relate to 
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subjective prioritization and was titled “Artistic Preferences and Subjective 
Prioritization”. The demographic composition of participants is summarized in table 1. 
The experimental setting was the Social Science Laboratory on the third floor of Uris 
Hall at Cornell University. The lab consisted of four cubicles, a circular table, and 
some filing cabinets and lab equipment.  
 
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics - Categorical Variables 
Variable Raw Percentage 
Race   
   Whites 52 54.2% 
   Asians 25 26.0% 
   Other1 19 19.8% 
Gender   
   Male 26 27.1% 
   Female 70 72.9% 
Income   
    <$10K-$29K 6   6.7% 
    $30K-$74K 21 23.3% 
    $75K-$150K< 63 70% 
   
Homogen2.   
  Gender H 60 62.5% 
  Race H 36 36.7% 
  Income H 46 46.9% 
Index3   
   0 8 8.3% 
   1 46 47.9% 
   2 30 31.3% 
   3 12 12.5% 
Missing 16 14.2% 
1”Other” includes Blacks, Hispanics, Multiracial and Others. These categories 
were combined to create balance in the variable.  
2”Homog” refers to Homogenous dyads in respect to gender, race, or parental 
income. The inverse category can be computed by subtracting the raw scores 
from 96; 16 cases had missing demographic information.  
3 “Index” refers to the number of traits (race, gender, class) a dyad shares. 0 
refers to no traits in common and 3 refers to all three traits in common.  
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Procedure   
Before I describe the details of the experiment, I will summarize the overall set 
up. The goal of the experiment was to see whether secrecy increases group cohesion. 
Hence the experiment involved four main parts: 1) creating a group, 2) generating a 
basic level of cohesion, 3) manipulating secrecy, and 4) measuring cohesion. The 
experiment contained two conditions with the only difference being that one entailed 
the creation of secrecy while the other did not. Each condition had five persons 
involved. Of those five, one was the experimenter, two were the confederates and two 
were the subjects. Furthermore each condition had two groups25 (or more precisely, 
two dyads) of two people (see figure 1).  The first group consisted of two subjects and 
the second group consisted of two confederates.  The subjects were led to believe that 
the confederates were participants much like themselves. The assignment to condition 
and group was done by the experimenter prior to each experimental session using an 
electronic random number generator.  The four participants in the experiment 
interacted face-to-face26
                                                 
25 While technically speaking my groups included two people, making them dyads (See Simmel’s 
essay “Quantitative Aspects of the Group” in Simmel (1964)).  Groups require, according to some 
definitions, more than two people, for simplicity I will refer to my two person collectivities as “groups” 
throughout the paper.   
26 Some studies involving groups opt for fictitious partners by having participants believe they are part 
of a group or that they are interacting with another group while they are really sitting behind computer 
terminals and interacting with a pre-programmed computer or experimenter. While this reduces noise, it 
raises the level of artificiality and some researchers of cohesion worry that genuine cohesion may not be 
generated when interaction is not face-to-face and propinquity that is characteristic of cohesive groups 
is manifestly absent. The digital interaction model may work for the study of some social psychological 
processes, it does not work well for cohesion and was hence not used.  
. The study was approved by Cornell’s Institutional Review 
Board for Human Participants; the protocol ID was 08-02-002.  
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Secret Condition Open Condition 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Experimental Setup 
The experiment proceeded as follows. The confederates (posing as subjects) as 
well as (actual) subjects waited outside the lab at a predetermined time.  The 
experimenter opened the lab door and seated all four participants at a rectangular table 
(two on each side) and asked them to fill a consent form (see Appendix A) before 
continuing. Two separate scripts were used for each condition. I won’t replicate the 
scripts here, but both the experimental and the control script are included in Appendix 
B and C, respectively.  
  After the subjects signed the consent form, they were asked to complete a task 
that would result in the formation of groups. The goal of the tasks was to assign 
subjects to a group which was: 1) artificially created, such that it is not based on any 
real characteristics of the subjects;    2) believable such that subjects believe that they 
are in a meaningful group and that they share something common with their group-
mates; and 3) status-neutral such that it is not inherently better to be in one group than 
the other.  The rationale for these three properties is as follows.  
First, groups based on socially/culturally salient characteristics such as race, 
gender, or academic status can create differences based on those characteristics 
themselves (Berger, Cohen and Zelditch Jr 1966; Berger, Cohen, and Zelditch Jr 1972; 
Hilton and Von Hippel 1996). For example if all the female black students were put in 
one group and all the white male students were placed in another group, the cohesion 
observed could have been due to those socially meaningful characteristics and 
Subject Subject 
Confed. Confed. 
Subject Subject 
Confed. Confed. 
35 
 
expectation states associated with those characteristics rather than my manipulation27
 Third, any differences in groups, even artificially created ones, could not be 
based on characteristics which the group members perceived to be valenced such that 
it was “better, more prestigious, more desirable” to be in one group then another. 
Status differences have been shown to result in the creation of power and prestige 
orders such that higher status actors perceive themselves and are perceived (by the 
lower status actors) as more competent at a task, even when the status difference has 
nothing to do with competence at the task (Berger, Rosenholtz, and Zelditch Jr 1980). 
. 
Similarly if I were to group individuals based on personality traits like extraversion, 
likeability, or intelligence, any differences I observe could be due to the behavioral 
consequences associated with those traits, rather than the manipulation. I wanted to 
eliminate this alternative explanation, such that any differences observed could be due 
to the experimental manipulation – secrecy.  Since the groups I created were based on 
a fictitious ability, where in reality groups were assigned randomly and all 
characteristics had an equal chance to be in either group, any endogenous explanations 
for differences in cohesion levels can be ruled out.  
 Second, the groups needed to be plausible or believable. I wanted to create 
some base-level of cohesion for groups in both conditions since increasing cohesion 
may depend upon at least some minimal sense of “togetherness”. It is hard to feel 
cohesive if there is not basis whatsoever other than the secrecy manipulation. 
Furthermore, part of the scope conditions of the theoretical idea that I am testing is 
that there have to be groups, since the theoretical proposition I am testing is that 
secrecy increases cohesion in groups.  Since this was done in both conditions it should 
not have affected the result.  
                                                 
27 For more details see the larger theoretical research program called Expectation States Theory. Two 
excellent reviews are by Wagner & Berger (2002) and Correll & Ridgeway (2003).  
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Indeed one of the main instruments used to establish this was the contrast sensitivity 
task. Subjects were presented with a series of twenty slides. Each slide was composed 
of an array of rectangles, colored in either black or white. Subjects were asked to 
estimate whether the slide had more black or white rectangles. They were then told 
that they had “very high contrast sensitivity ability” or “very low contrast sensitivity 
ability. In reality each slide included the same number of black and white rectangles 
and subjects were randomly assigned to the high or low contrast sensitivity assessment 
(Rosenberg and Turner 1981). Two other fictitious ability tests used (especially in the 
earlier phases of the Expectations States Program) for this purpose are the Meaning 
Insight Ability Test and the Relational Insight Ability Test, both of which are 
presented to subjects as “measuring a basic ability of an individual” but actually being 
artificial (Berger and Fisek 1970:293).  The reason I have not used those tasks was 
because I wanted to explicitly rule out any difference that could have been due to 
status characteristics. It is plausible that a high status group may experience cohesion 
on account of being in the “high ability group” or being the “competent ones”. The 
opposite process of lowered cohesion may result in the low cohesion group. I wanted 
to rule this alternative explanation out and employed another task that would divide 
the individuals in groups that were different but such that the differences had no 
evaluative connotations.  
 One of the basic findings of the social identity research program is that even 
trivial differences and similarities are sufficient for people to organize into groups that 
favor in-group members and discriminate against out-group members in attitudinal 
evaluation and resource allocation (Tajfel & Turner 1979:33-47; Tajfel 1970). To 
establish experimental evidence for this claim, researchers used the so-called “minimal 
group paradigm”. Subjects were assigned into groups that were based on “ad hoc, 
arbitrary, and minimally meaningful categories”(Abrams  1996:390). Inter-group 
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effects based on trivial characteristics were observed with different colored lab coats 
(Worchel et al. 1978), different colored wristbands (Bernstein, Young, and Hugenberg 
2007), bogus personality tests, and even different colored experimental booklets 
(Vanbeselaere and Originally 1993). 
I used either the Klee-Kandinsky Task or the Dot Estimation Task28. The 
assignment worked as follows. In the Klee-Kandinsky task (Chaserant 2006; Tajfel et 
al. 1971, study 2), subjects were given color booklets used by (Kalkhoff and Barnum 
2000)29
 For the Dot Estimation task (Gerard and Hoyt 1974; Jetten et al. 2000; Jetten, 
Spears, and Manstead 1996) I used the design by Cynthia Pickett
 which had 10 paintings of the famous painters arrayed in two paintings per 
page labeled painting A and painting B. Subjects were instructed to choose  the 
painting they liked most (either A or B) on each page – for a total of five choices. An 
example is given in Appendix D.  
30 with some 
modifications. The slides exploit a feature of Microsoft PowerPoint in that slide 
exposure can be timed precisely.  I used a laptop situated in the front of the table to 
expose the participants to ten slides of the Senton31
                                                 
28 I began using the Klee-Kandinsky task but switched to the Dot Estimation task since a small 
number of subjects were familiar with the painters and did not believe their assigned group. When 
conducting the analysis I controlled for the task type and found no meaningful difference, as was 
theoretically expected.   
29 The color booklets were generously supplied to me by William Kalkhoff , which I duplicated. Only 
the cover page was modified.  
 Dot Estimation Task. Each slide 
had a constellation of two types of dots, large or small, in various quantities. The 
participants were given a sheet of paper and asked to estimate the number of dots. The 
choices were: a.10-20     b. 21-30     c. 31-40     d.41-50     e. 51-60     f. 61-70     g. 71-
30 The design of the slides is available at a social psychology instrument repository for 
electronic/computer-based instruments, tests, and stimuli called SocialThinking.org, maintained by the 
lab of Dr.Neale Roese – a social psychologist at the University of Illinoise, Urbana-Champaigne. The 
Dot Estimation Task slides are is available here: http://www.socialthinking.org/mlwfiles.html  
31 “Senton” was added to further a sense of legitimacy (and hence believability in the subsequent 
results) to the task.  
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80. Following convention, they were first given a practice slide.  An example of a 
constellation slide is included in Appendix E.  
Once the subjects submitted their answers, the experimenter retreated into one 
of the cubicles and proceeded to feign calculating their score. In reality the 
experimenter used a random number generator to assign the participants into one of 
two groups. Each of the participants and confederates were assigned into opposite 
groups. The experimenter then stepped out of the cubicle and announced the 
assignments into the two groups, asking the members of the two groups to sit at 
opposite sides of the table.  
Next the participants were asked to occupy one of two cubicles – one for each 
group. Participants were then given a minimal cohesion building task. The idea was to 
have the participants engage in a collective task such that some sense of collective 
orientation is created and floor effects are avoided.  Once again, this was done to 
create a sense of “groupness”. Tasks involving intra-group competition were avoided 
for obvious reasons and tasks involving inter-group competition were avoided to rule 
out competition-cohesion effects (Sherif 1961; Stein 1976).The task used was the Lost 
on The Moon Task (Hall and Watson 1970; Johnson 1991; see alsoMerrill 1971) as a 
team identity building exercise. The task involves a scenario where one is asked to 
imagine that their spaceship has crashed on the moon. The mother ship is located 200 
miles away from the crashed spaceship and the cosmonauts need to make the journey 
by foot. However they can only take ten32
                                                 
32 The set up was changed from 15 to 10 items since subjects were taking too long to answer with 15 
items.  
  items with them. The participants are 
presented with a list of 10 items and are asked to rank them from 1-10.  See Appendix 
E. During pre-testing the LOM task was confirmed to boost cohesion to a minimal 
level in both conditions.  
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 Next, in the experimental condition, the experimenter approached the subjects 
with a manila folder and a sheet with a blank line in the middle and a stamp marked 
“Secret” on top. The subjects were then quietly told the following:  
 
You are going to play a game with the other team. Part of the game you will 
play with the other team involves coming up with a secret password that they 
(the other team) must not know. Please take a moment to come up with such a 
password and remember it. In addition, we would ask you to write down the 
password on this sheet and insert it into this manila envelope, which you will 
take with you as we join the other team members.  
In the control condition the fill-in sheet did not have “secret” stamped at the top and 
the chosen word was framed as a “word” rather than a “password”. The participants 
were told:  
Part of the game you will play with the other team involves coming up with a 
word, which you will show to the other team when you see them. Please take a 
moment to come up with such a word and remember it. 
Once both groups of participants have chosen their words, they were asked to 
rejoin at the main table. In the control condition subjects were asked to exchange the 
manila folders and observe each other’s words33
Measures  
. This was not done in the 
experimental condition. Next participants were given the Perceived Cohesion 
Questionnaire, followed by a Demographic Questionnaire. Upon completion, the 
subject were individually debriefed, probed for suspicion, and compensated.  
 
 Cohesion was measured using the Perceived Cohesion Scale (Bollen and 
Hoyle 1990; 1999). The PCS has two components: an affective component – 
measuring the emotional morale of the group and a cognitive component – measuring 
the cognitive belongingness to the group. An average of all the PCS questions is the 
                                                 
33 This manipulation of secrecy may appear as relatively weak. This is an issue that will be addressed 
in the “Experimental Extensions” section. The short explanation is that it is very difficult to manipulate 
secrecy (but not other processes like status or power) in a clean way. The hope was that some 
differences would be detected with the design.   
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overall cohesion measure. The range of the scale is from 1 (lowest) to 7 (highest). The 
correlation between the two cohesion types is .8, which was similar to what the 
validation studies reported. A copy of the PCS is presented in Appendix G.  
Trust was measured during debriefing34
Table 2:  Descriptive Statistics of Key Continuous Variables 
 by asking “On a scale from 1-5 with 1 
being completely distrusted and 5 being completely trusted, how much did you trust 
your partner?  
Liking was measured during debriefing by asking “On a scale from 1-5 with 1 
being completely disliked and 5 being liked very much, how much did you like your 
partner? The correlation between trust and liking was only .45.  
This of course is not an ideal way to control for variables in an experiment, 
since both trust and like could capture personality variables. Subjects who were 
inherently more trustworthy or affection-providing could have scored high on these 
measures rather than genuinely react to the trustworthiness or likeability of their 
partners. This point will be addressed in the limitation and extension section of the 
paper.  
Table 2 presents the average scores across the two conditions on those 
variables.  
Variable  Mean SD Range 
Affective    
Cohesion 4.98 1.07 1( least) - 7 (most) 
Cognitive 
Cohesion 5.35 1.14 1( least) - 7 (most) 
Cohesion 
Overall 5.17 1.05 1( least) - 7 (most) 
Trust 3.87 0.84 1( least) - 5 (most) 
Liked 3.91 0.71 1( least) - 5 (most) 
                                                 
34 The reason why trust and liking were measured during debriefing was that the table at which the 
participants sat was relatively tight and I was afraid that participants might peek and influence each 
other’s answers on such personal questions regarding trust and liking. Since debriefing was done 
outside the room and the other team member could not hear the answers, the confidence in the answers 
could be expected to be higher. 
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RESULTS OF THE STUDY 
The dependent variable in this study was cohesion measured by the perceived 
cohesion scale in a dyad35
 Because the data points collected were not independent but nested in a unit, 
using simple T-tests and OLS regressions would have been inappropriate. Since the 
dyads were homogenous (i.e. there was no theoretical difference between the dyad 
components) a hierarchical linear model was used to model the data (Kenny;Kashy 
and Cook 2006; Luke 2004; Snijders)
. The participants were interacting in a symmetric dyad, 
hence the sources of variation on the dependent variable came from two sources – the 
individual level and the dyadic level.  
36
Table 3: Secrecy Effect on Overall Perceived Cohesion  
. I have used the Linear Mixed Model with a 
Restricted Maximum Likelihood (REML) estimation procedure. The Wald Test was 
used to compute coefficients.  
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model5 
Intercept 5.15 5.28 1.62 .38 .54 
Test Variables 
Condition1                               
     Experimental  
                  
-.21 (.21) 
                        
1.97*  
(.86) 
                         
3.33** 
(1.01) 
                         
3.39** 
(1.11) 
Liked   .47**   
(.16) 
.73*** 
(.16) 
.78*** 
(.17) 
Trust   .47**   
(.14) 
.53**    
(.16) 
.47**  
(.17) 
Condition*Trust   -.57**   
(.22) 
-.89**  
(.26) 
-.89** 
(.27) 
      
                                                 
35 Cohesion is a collective property, though it is measured attitudinally on an individual level - how 
attached the person feels to the group. It would have been much easier to design the experiment to have 
three confederates rather than two, such that the subject interacted in a dyad with a confederate (along 
with the other confederates on the opposite team). Such a design would have introduced an element of 
artificiality since cohesion is a product of two interactants that mutually influence one another. Having 
a confederate who behaves in a relatively constant manner across conditions may undermine the 
cohesion of the subject. 
36 Since each unit in the dyad is homogenous, or what Griffin and Gonzalez (1995) call exchangeable 
or interchangeable, a hierarchical linear model (HLM) was used. If it was distinguishable a different 
analysis utilizing structural equation modeling (SEM) would have been utilized (Gonzalez and Griffin 
1999) . 
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Table 3 (Continued) 
Demographic Variables 
Race1      
  Black    -.07 (.24) .07 (.28) 
  Other    .18 (.23) .22  (.24) 
Gender1      
  Men    -.44* 
(.21) 
-.57* 
(.23) 
Income1      
   >10K-29K    -.45 (.37) -.5 (.4) 
   30K-75K     .36  (.23) .39 (.26) 
Homogeneity Variables 
RaceHomog     -.49 (.36) 
GenderHomog     -.09 (.41) 
IncomeHomog     -.34 (.41) 
Index Homog     1.1 (.87) 
Homog Index 0     .511 (.5) 
Homog Index 13      
      
Residual Variance 
    Level 1 (τ2)   .94 
(.18) 
.94 (.18) .89  (.12) .89  (.12)       0.65 
(.16) 
    Level 2 (σ2) .16 
(.15) 
.16  (.15) 0.000 0.000 0.08 
(.15) 
 
-2*Log 
Likelihood2 
328.39 328.67 296.322*
** 
219.7*** 218.05**
* 
N 112 112 107 86 86 
*p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001 significance level;  Standard Errors are in 
paranthesis 
1 Reference Categories for: Condition – Control; Race – Whites; Gender – 
female; Parental Income – 76K-<  
2 The -2LL denotes whether the model fit is improved significantly when 
compared with an intercept-only model. Significance levels are calculated using 
the Likelihood Ratio Test.  
3HomogIndex 2 was perfectly collinear with some other dimension in the model 
and hence the parameter was redundant and not estimated. 
I began by estimating the null model with trial set as a random effect to 
compute the intraclass correlation coefficient (ICC). Variability between trials was 
16% and variability within trials was 98%, for an ICC of 14%. This confirms the 
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utility of the mixed model as substantial variation can be explained on the group-level. 
See model 1, table 3.  
The next model included condition only. Unfortunately the coefficients were 
not significant and no effect was detected. See table 3, model 2. 
Thereafter controls were added.  It was reasoned that noise would be generated 
in the cohesion level if partners simply didn’t like one another or didn’t trust one 
another. Some minimal level of trust and likability would therefore have to be 
established for secrecy to have an effect. For example, if there was some dislike for 
the partner, the supposed cohesion-induced effect of secrecy may have been cancelled 
out. Therefore liked and trust were entered as controls next37
                                                 
37 As expected both liked and trust by themselves positively predicted cohesion. One unit increase in 
Liked increased cohesion by .56 points (p=.000). One unit increase in Trusted increased cohesion by .38 
points (p=.001). The correlation between the two was only .45. 
. Since trust and liking 
(separately) had an effect when condition was entered I tried adding an interaction 
term into the model. There was indeed an interaction between trust and condition (but 
not for liking and condition). Specifically a disordinal/cross-over interaction was 
identified, between secrecy and trust; secrecy has a positive effect on cohesion when 
trust is low but a negative effect when trust is high.   Participants exposed to the 
experimental condition have their cohesion increased by 1.4 units over subjects in the 
control condition, when trust is 1; but have their cohesion decreased by -.03 units, 
when trust is 3.5,  and decreased by 2.02 units when trust is 7, adjusting for other 
variables in the model. See table 3, model 3. Figure 2 illustrates the interaction effect 
of condition on cohesion at different levels of trust. This suggests that secrecy creates 
cohesion when trust is low, but when trust is high cohesion gets diluted, by somehow 
counteracting the effect of trust. Perhaps when one trusts someone, sharing a secret 
becomes onerous – one worries about disclosing the secret. More likely this is an 
artifact.  
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There is also an unexpected effect of trust. In the secrecy condition increasing 
trust by one unit leads to a decrease in cohesion by .10 units. In the control condition 
(no secrecy), increasing trust by one unit leads to an increase in cohesion by .47 units. 
One would expect trust and cohesion to increase in the secrecy condition.  
 
 
Figure 2:  Illustration of a Disordinal Interaction Effect Between Trust and                                        
   Condition 
Next I tried adding demographic variables into the model such as race, gender, 
and parental income. These are some of the most robust variables in sociological 
analysis and it was worth examining whether they contribute to cohesion (when 
condition) is considered.  Again, there was no effect for condition unless condition 
was interacted with trust. Gender was however found to have a slight effect. Cohesion 
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decreased by .44 units if the member of a dyad is a man, adjusting for all other 
variables in the model. See table 3, model 4. I don’t have a good theoretical account 
for why this may have happened. This effect may be artifactual as the sample was 
overwhelmingly female. Also the gender effect disappears when gender is considered 
without other demographic characteristics.  
Perhaps demographic variables played a role in a different way. Participants 
were interacting in dyads containing people both similar and different from them 
along the different dimensions. Social identity theory claims that individuals who 
share traits will develop identity on that basis alone. Perhaps the more similar one is to 
one’s partner, the more cohesion he or she will feel toward them and perhaps secrecy 
will tip the scales of cohesion slightly. A scale was created such that the subjects were 
either completely dissimilar (shared no characteristics along race, gender, or parental 
income) or completely similar (shared all three characteristics). Alternatively maybe 
homogeneity along specific dimensions (e.g. race, gender, class upbringing) but not 
others was what really mattered. Homophily effects have been well-documented as 
people are attracted to similar others and perhaps experience more cohesion when 
being in a group with similar rather than dissimilar others (McPherson, Smith-Lovin, 
and Cook 2001). However, none turned out significant. Again there was an interaction 
effect. See table 3, model 5. I also ran the homogeneity variables without the 
demographic controls, but present them together in model 5 for a nested comparison.  
Controlling for other variables such as academic year, major, and academic 
discipline were not found to have an effect.  Efforts to control for the age of the 
respondents or the region of the United States did not produce any differences either.  
Finally, I controlled for the various elements of the experiment itself, which 
potentially were covering up effects. Variables such as whether the participants were 
assigned to a Klee group or Kandinsky group, whether the Dot Estimation Task was 
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used, whether the specific confederates had an effect, whether the specific 
experimenter had an effect, whether the compensation chosen was cash or credit, 
whether manila folder was used, and whether a certain version of the Lost on the 
Moon task was used, and even the coders who coded the data.   
 I have also checked the results when the perceived cohesion measure is split 
into its affective and cognitive components. Neither has a main effect of condition 
only. Again there is an interaction effect for both but it is more stable for affective 
than cognitive cohesion. There is also an odd effect of parental income in the 30-75K 
when homogeneity controls are added. The stronger effect of affective cohesion is 
probably to be understood in that secrecy works stronger on the visceral level of 
cohesion. Cognitively there is no reason why one will view oneself more as a member 
of a group once one shares a secret. It is likely that the aforementioned mechanisms of 
secrecy and cohesion are more subconscious and result in a feeling first and cognition 
consistent with the feeling second.  
 
Ancillary Analysis 
The items on the cohesion scale were checked for internal validity. Consistent 
with previous studies the items were highly correlated with a Chronbach’s alpha of 
.92.  
I checked that the residuals of the most plausible models were normally distributed 
and that they satisfied the homogeneity of variance assumption. Similarly I checked 
for collinearity for the independent variables used. The assumptions of the mixed 
linear model were satisfied. Also observations done by different coders were checked 
for systematic discrepancies and none were found.   
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DISCUSSION OF RESULTS 
 Despite the somewhat mixed results I am not highly confident in the findings. 
The sample size was relatively small and the interaction finding was unexpected. It 
would have been more impressive to find a main effect of secrecy on cohesion.  More 
importantly it is hard to interpret the interaction effect theoretically. Had the 
interaction effect been in the opposite direction, such that secrecy increased cohesion 
but only at moderate and higher levels of trust, the effect would have been more 
interpretable. Perhaps one needs some basic level of trust for secrecy to work and 
create cohesion. It is not at all clear why high levels of trust would decrease cohesion 
for the secrecy condition. It would have been more plausible if there was no effect at 
all. In that case one might interpret the results that at low levels of trust secrecy can 
generate cohesion but if there is high trust, one does not need secrecy.  
 Other results such as the effect of gender, the effect of the middle income 
group for affective cohesion, and the backward effect of trust for main cohesion is 
hard to interpret.  
 Trust was not optimally operationalized and the observed interactions could be 
artifacts. The results are not conclusive and not ready to be publicized. However, a 
strengthened design can address some of the weaknesses of the study. This will be the 
subject of the next section of the paper.   
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EXPERIMENTAL EXTENSIONS 
While the study described here did not achieve conclusive results a number of 
extensions and modifications in the design suggested themselves in the course of 
doing the research. The extensions have to do with five elements: 1) strengthening the 
manipulation; 2) diversifying the measure of cohesion; 3) homing in on the 
mechanism 4) eliminating confounds; 5) having more robust confound checks and 
manipulation checks; 6) as well as making other design tweaks.  
 
Strengthening the Manipulation  
One concern regarding the experiment was the strength of the chief 
manipulation – secrecy. Did the participants actually experience a sense of sharing a 
secret? Part of the challenge of manipulating secrecy is to prime it alone and not to 
(simultaneously) prime other dimensions such as status, excitability, group identity, 
instrumental value. A lot of thought and care went into designing the right 
experimental set up, but one could still do better.  
One possibility is to have the participants interact over the task a bit more such 
that the secrecy is primed repeatedly. Perhaps the participants would come up with an 
esoteric ritual, password, or symbol combination, which they would communicate to 
one another repeatedly and in different contexts38
                                                 
38 This suggestion was provided by Thomas Gilovich 
. The control condition will have the 
communication done openly. It would be expected that the very act of communication 
and interaction would produce cohesion in the control condition, but more cohesion 
should be produced in the secret condition. 
 Perhaps part of the task would be that the other team will try to guess the 
secret word  
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I have them come up with an esoteric ritual, password, and symbol combination. In 
both conditions they are asked to ask questions to try to guess the other sides’ 
password. However, in the control condition they are asked to reveal it or maybe just 
come up with ritual, password, and symbol in front of the other team, such that they 
hear it.  
Part of the reason I did not want to assign the secret word was that I was 
worried that status might be manipulated as a result – subjects might think that they 
were picked for a reason – therefore I wanted to have the subjects generate the secret 
“from the bottom up” so to speak. However, another possibility is that the subjects 
draw “random” lots such that any secrecy designation is perceived to be a chance 
event.   
Perhaps having subjects more invested in coming up with the secret would be 
important, such that, one person comes up with first half of the password and the other 
person with the other half, or each comes up with a set of letters. This is not central to 
the theory. Indeed, secret societies operate well beyond its charter members who came 
up with all the rituals. The weight of tradition may even add to the legitimacy. 
Nonetheless it may be worth asking who came up with the word during debriefing 
(something I have not done) and control for it statistically.  
 It may also be that not any and all content may equally suit to be a secret or a 
secret password. It may be that words, rituals, or symbols that are exotic or unordinary 
in some way, would be more effective.  
 
Diversifying Measures of Cohesion 
 The measure of cohesion – my dependent variable – was carefully chosen 
given the problem I investigated. The perceived cohesion scale was one of the state of 
the art measures of cohesion. However, adding other scales of cohesion such as the 
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Group Environment Questionnaire (Brawley, Carron, and Widmeyer 1988) may have 
been more convincing for scholars of that research program.  Furthermore, no measure 
is perfect and it is best to use a variety of indicators, particularly different kinds of 
indicators.  In addition to the attitudinal measure such as PCS, having a behavioral 
measure would have been particularly useful.  In fact toward the end of the experiment 
I tried adding a behavioral measure, but too few trials had it incorporated and so 
results were not reported. I had subjects play a version of the Dictator game (Forsythe 
et al. 1994; Kahneman, Knetsch, and Thaler 1986) called the points allocation task. 
Participants were instructed:  
You have 100 points which you can allocate to the four participants in today’s 
study.  The points correspond to real money (at some ratio; all participants 
will receive actual money based on the allocations you make).   Please make 
an allocation between the four persons. The total must sum to 100.  
 They were then instructed to allocate between themselves, the person who was 
their teammate, the person sitting diagonally from them and the person sitting opposite 
of them (the later two being the members of the other group).   
 Another good behavioral measure, used in early studies and encouraged by 
Dion in his review (Dion 2000:22) is the counting of “I” and “we” statements in 
interaction. He cites several early studies (p.9) and encourages this kind of 
methodology (p.22). The idea is that members of cohesive groups refer more to 
themselves as “we” than as “I”. This can be done by having individuals write letters of 
what the task was about or complete a fill-in story, where blanks can be filled with an 
“I” or a “we”.  
 Perhaps taking cohesion measures before and after the treatment would have 
been more robust, though the fact that participants were assigned to groups randomly 
would take care of the objection that there were different levels of cohesion 
susceptibility. The other worry of the before-and-after design is that it may alert 
participants to the research hypothesis. However, administering different cohesion 
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metrics (that are otherwise highly correlated) alongside some filler questions (to 
distract the participants) may partly solve this problem.  
 
Fleshing out Mechanisms  
 The present study tried to rule out some mechanisms for how secrecy increases 
cohesion. For example accounts involving status were ruled out by not having secrecy 
be connected to any resource and by making sure that the groups were organized 
based on a status-neutral trait. Social identity mechanisms were ruled out by having 
both teams form groups based on the same trait and by later controlling for 
homogeneity of the dyads along the most socially salient dimensions of homophily as 
well as the index of degree of homogeneity (how many of such traits did participants 
share). However, exact mechanisms were not fully or adequately investigated.  
Given my results, trust is a key variable. Is trust a mediating variable, a 
moderating variable, a confounding variable, or simply epiphenomenal to secrecy?  In 
the current study I tried to get at this question by asking subjects how much they 
trusted their partner and controlling for the response in my statistical model of the 
data. This of course is imperfect for many reasons. For one thing, the use of an 
experiment should exploit the virtue of the design for experimental rather than 
statistical control. Part of the problem with statistical controls is that they may reflect 
personality differences, which random assignment only partly controls for.  
Since it was implicated in an interaction with the key variable – condition – it 
should be manipulated directly. This can be done following a version of a trust game 
described in other studies (Berg, Dickhaut, and McCabe 1995; Fetchenhauer and 
Dunning 2009). One participant is asked to donate money to the other participant out 
of a sum of $10. If the other participant matches the money within a certain range the 
experimenter doubles the money for both. If s/he does not, they both lose. The opening 
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gambit signals how much you trust the other person. To manipulate trust, the 
experimenter may ask the participants to write the figure down on paper and then 
provide a false number to the other team member – low numbers in the low condition, 
medium in the medium condition, and high in the high condition. Instructions not to 
communicate about the interaction afterwards and other details will obviously have to 
also be included.  
Subjects should be assigned to low, medium, and high trust conditions and 
exposed to secrecy in a two by three design (see table 4). If trust is not implicated the 
prediction would be as follows.  a=b=c>d=e=f. If it is it clearly implicated it would 
look like this: c>b>a>f>e>d. The higher the level of trust the more secrecy has an 
effect on cohesion. A similar effect for the control condition would be expected 
though the highest trust condition should still have less cohesion than the lowest trust-
secrecy condition.  
 
Table 4: Testing the Trust Account Design 
 Trust 
Low Med High 
Secrecy Secrecy a b c 
Control d e f 
 
The other alternative explanation involves Wegner’s obsessive preoccupation 
(Wegner, Lane, and Dimitri 1994) where consistent rumination on secrecy produced 
interpersonal attraction. These kinds of cognitive explanations can be tested for with a 
cognitive load task. (Gilbert, Pelham, and Krull 1988; Gilbert and Osborne 1989). 
Note that this is only the case with conscious cognitive processes (as opposed to 
automatic processes) and there is debate regarding the extent to which processes like 
53 
 
cognitive dissonance or obsessive preoccupation are auotomatic vs effortful39
Table 5: Testing the Cognitive Busyness Account Design 
.  In this 
task participants’ attentional or cognitive resources are occupied, typically by playing 
sound tones of high and low pitch and having them count chimes of only the lowest 
pitch (Lieberman et al. 2001) or by having participants memorize numbers of 4 digits, 
6 digits, and 8 digits – thus varying the extent of the cognitive busyness (Yzerbyt, 
Coull, and Rocher 1999). This is done simultaneously of whatever task they are 
performing, in the cognitive-busyness condition. Since the mind can only process a 
finite amount of cognitive information, cognitive processes in the background are 
effectively elbowed out (Gilbert and Osborne 1989). In a 2x2 design two additional 
conditions of cognitive busyness and non-cognitive busyness would be introduced (see 
table 5). If the obsessive preoccupation account is correct, the prediction would be as 
follows: b>a≥c=d. The cognitively distracted subjects should not experience a boost in 
cohesion if secrecy operates through a cognitive mechanism. In the control condition 
cognitive resource depletion should have no effect.  
 
 Cognitive Busyness 
Cognitively Busy Control (non-busy) 
Secrecy Secrecy a b 
Control c d 
 
                                                 
39 In a somewhat different study and design from their “footsie” study discussed earlier, Lane and 
Wegner (1995) suggest that the preoccupation process of secrecy may be automatically controlled, in 
which case my proposed study may not adequately rule out the preoccupation mechanism. However, 
they do suggest some checks of whether rumination is actually occurring, which may be profitably 
employed instead. For example, differential response times on the Stroop task may indicate 
rumination/hyperaccessibility of the secret.   
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 Finally mechanisms involving self-esteem, need for uniqueness, or sense of 
exclusivity can be investigated in the following way. Psychological properties such as 
self-esteem can be threatened or enhanced. One way this is done is by giving subjects 
a valued achievement test of some sort (e.g. IQ test)  and telling them that they either 
did “much worse” or “much better” than most people who took the test (Rsin and 
Spencer 1997). If the self-esteem account is correct, we should see the following 
pattern: a>c>b>d≥e≥f. Participants who had their self-esteem threatened should 
experience the highest levels of cohesion, followed by controls, followed by those 
who had their self-esteem enhanced.  
 
Table 6: Testing the Self-Esteem Account Design 
 Self-Esteem 
Self-esteem 
threatened 
Self-esteem 
Enhanced 
Control (self-
esteem neither 
threatened nor 
enhanced) 
Secrecy Secrecy a b c 
Control d e f 
 
Conducting More Confound Checks 
 Other confound checks should be instituted. Testing for affective effects can be 
examined by administering the now-common PANAS test (Watson, Clark, and 
Tellegen 1988).  
To ensure that trivial group membership was salient, the post-study 
questionnaire included an  item for which subjects designated on a seven-point Likert-
type scale the similarity of themselves as a person to each of their partners (1 = not at 
all similar to me; 7 = extremely similar to me). This measure would allow the 
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assessment of the effectiveness of the manipulation of trivial group membership. A 
more detailed Partner Likeability Questionnaire would be more sensitive. I have 
actually implemented one toward the end of the experiment (see Appendix H). Along 
similar lines probing during debriefing for things such as who came up with the word 
and whether the participants felt they actually held (or were holding) the secret word 
after they came up with it, would be well-advised.  
 Furthermore looking into the temperance of the secret – asking whether the 
participants anticipated that the secret will be revealed or not may be revealing of how 
seriously they absorbed the manipulation. If the participants thought their secret will 
probably be revealed to the other group – the secrecy may simply not have had its 
effect – it was expected to be too transient to really be “secret”.   
 
Other Design Elements 
 Though the experimental design was generally carefully-crafted, I realized in 
the course of running the study that there are other features of the design that could be 
“tightened”.  Some design decision had to do with practicality others did not occur to 
me until well into the experiment.  
 Practical issues of using groups (of three or more persons) rather than dyads 
would certainly have made the findings more impressive. However the practical 
aspects of coordinating such a study are quite challenging. Even with dyads, when one 
person did not show up as scheduled, the experiment was cancelled and an opportunity 
cost was incurred. This happened frequently enough to be an obstacle. Running the 
experiment with three people would have been even more disruptive. However, 
eventually extending the experiment to triads would be important.  
Increasing the number and the diversity of subjects would be very helpful. Part 
of the problem with having 56 participants per condition is that one’s statistical power 
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is relatively low and as a result the chance of making a false negative “finding” 
(claiming there is no effect, when in reality there is) greatly increases. Similarly (this 
is a general trend and not particular to my study) there is an overwhelming tendency 
for participant volunteers to be white women, which makes it hard to detect gender 
and race effects. The fact that participants are randomly assigned to condition does not 
help if both conditions are overwhelmingly white and female. Consequently, we don’t 
know if the process operates similarly for men or for persons of color.  
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THEORETICAL EXTENSIONS AND PRACTICAL CONTRIBUTIONS 
The sustained academic study of secrecy is important and may shed light on many 
areas of interest to social science such as social capital, norm theory,  the maintenance 
of power inequality, and symbolic capital. The study also has practical implications 
for disrupting criminal groups that utilize secrecy to maintain themselves such as 
transnational organized crime syndicates, terrorist organizations, and urban gangs.  
 
Theoretical Extensions 
Gist (1940) noted that the United States was especially prolific in producing 
secret societies; citing Mertz he claimed that the US had approximately 800 secret 
societies, with a total of 30 million members (p.349) before WWII.  Interestingly, 
there was a strong counter-movement led by Christian reformer groups, against secret 
societies, whom they charged with “fraternalism”40
                                                 
40 While fraternalism connotes male-exclusive groups, women also formed  exclusive secret societies. 
So did minorities excluded from white secret societies. Oftentimes these societies paralleled the 
dominant group’s symbols, rituals, and practices (See Gist 1938: 351) 
, a practice they saw as contrary to 
Christianity’s emphasis on universalism. Since WWII there had been a massive 
decline of secret societies. It is not clear whether such decline is simply a symptom of 
the larger trend of declining social capital (Putnam 2000). Indeed Putnam briefly 
mentions secret societies in his chapter on “The Dark Side of Social Capital” (p.350) 
but the analysis is unsystematic. Secret societies indeed represent a perverse form of 
social capital but we do not know why individuals join secret civic organization as 
opposed to open ones. We do not know if secret civic societies are more resilient, if 
they decline slower or quicker. The analysis by Laurence Iannaccone (1994) of 
traditional and liberal churches bears on this issue. Iannaccone argues that strict 
churches impose greater costs on their members by weeding out free-riders who 
consume more of the public good than they contribute.  Some secret societies have 
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become more transparent in recent years by discussing the meaning of their rituals, 
publicizing members, and opening up their lodges to outsiders – with the rationale that 
secrecy was turning perspective members away. It would be interesting to study 
whether this had an unintended opposite effect.  
What about the type of content that a secret protects. Sociologists such as Max 
Weber (1968) Talcott Parsons (1968), and Rosabeth Moss Kanter (1972) distinguished 
between instrumental and value-based social action, goals, and cohesion. Perhaps 
business secrets having to do with the maximization of profits are qualitatively 
different than religious secrets having to do with moral or terminal values.  
Secrecy, in particular secret norms, has a paradoxical implication for norm 
theory. While social scientists disagree on the exact nature of norms, there is largely a 
consensus that norms need to be known in order for them to be followed and 
sanctioned if they are broken (Hechter and Opp 2001). Hechter and Opp define norms 
as “socially shared prescriptions or proscriptions for behavior p.278” But socially 
shared by whom?  What about secret norms? Consider the following practice of a 
secret society – whenever one sees a member one must greet him with a secret 
handshake – this norm is only known by members of the secret group and its 
knowledge is actively hidden from the wider public; it may be disguised, denied if 
asked, or deliberately misrepresented. The secret norms are not socially shared, yet 
they are shared among the secret ingroup. Sanctioning for violating the norm cannot 
be done publically for it will raise questions. For these reasons one might ask whether 
secret norms really are norms and whether they have any special properties that 
ordinary norms do not have as far as how they are maintained and how they emerge. 
Similarly secrecy also poses challenges to such elemental questions as what is a 
group and what is an intergroup relation. Tajfel considers intergroup relations to 
involve both internal and external criteria. A group must be aware of and consider 
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itself as a group and a group must be considered by others to be a group (Tajfel 1982). 
Furthermore he says “There can be no intergroup behavior unless there is also some 
"outside" consensus that the group exists” (p.2). Secret groups whose membership is 
unknown form an exception to this since they only satisfy the internal criteria, yet exist 
as groups and interact with outgroups. The focus on the external environment makes 
sense since it is by social interaction that one comes to define and feel as part of a 
group, to develop an identity, and the outgoup sometimes plays a subtle but key role in 
this process. It is probably an accurate characterization of most social groups. 
However, this is not so for secret groups. Indeed it is the very absence of recognition 
of the group by the outside environment that in a sense makes it a group. Once the 
secret is out, in some cases, the group may cease to exist. Tajfel’s larger point is about 
intergroup relations, but the same problem applies. Consider a secret group (e.g. group 
A) whose members interact with an open group (e.g. group B). Group A members 
interact as individuals and members of group B think they are unconnected 
individuals. A nice example of this is discussed in Baker and Faulkner (1993) of a 
well-documented price-fixing conspiracy by several corporations in the heavy electric 
equipment industry. According to Tajfel this is not an intergroup interaction since one 
of the groups is not aware of the other, but of course that’s not exactly true – the price-
fixing cartel was acting as a group toward buyer parties, which thought they were 
interacting with individuals who were competing with one another. A similar situation 
occurs in secret political alliances. How should such cases be treated and what 
implications does this have for theorizing intergroup relations?  
Scholars of power inequality may also benefit from the analysis of secrecy. Early 
theories of the emergence of status and power hierarchies have emphasized the 
importance of secrecy. Weber’s theory of how status differences are legitimated by the 
closure of social intercourse between status unequals (Weber et al 1991) is of 
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particular relevance. It is counter-intuitive but the maintenance of secrecy may itself 
be a power move. Secrecy may (though not always) encourage deference. There is a 
self-reinforcing connection between secrecy and power. Those in power maintain 
secrecy and those who are acknowledged to hold a secret are deferred to and hence 
legitimated in the eyes of others. The esoteric wisdom of pre-modern priests or 
modern technocratic experts elicits submission. Paradoxically once the uncertainty and 
the ambiguity that the experts confront is more widely known by the layity, deference 
is sometimes challenged. This has become apparent with the science studies 
movement and the emboldenment of the laity to question scientific authority on such 
diverse issues as vaccines, global warming, creationism, alternative medicine, and 
various public health policies such as fluoridation (for an excellent discussion of this 
see Collins and Evans 2002). While most modern democratic institutions have 
abandoned secrecy as a legitimate practice some continue to follow it. For example the 
Supreme Court of the United States and some lower courts prohibit cameras in the 
courtroom on the grounds that it may undermine the augustness and authority of the 
proceedings. The study of secrecy as a status signal promises to be profitable.  
Secrecy may also be an important form of symbolic capital. One of the paradoxes 
of the secret is that it can signal value, without its object having any extrinsic value.  If 
one wants to start a religion, one would not want to make it simple and plain, and have 
lots of practical answers for possible questions. While one would want to make it 
relatively understandable one would also want it to be highly mysterious and 
profound. There is a kind of seduction of the secretive or an allure of the mysterious. 
Concealment may explain how certain symbolic information comes to be viewed as 
valuable.  
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Practical Contributions 
The study of the secrecy-cohesion relationship also has a number of practical 
implications. The practice of secrecy is often adopted by groups who are interested in 
breaking the law and which are actively hunted by the law enforcement agencies of 
civic society. Transnational crime syndicates, inner-city gangs, hate groups, violent 
anti-abortion groups, and terrorist organizations all rely on secrecy to shield 
themselves from authorities. Weakening such groups is in the interest of society. If 
cohesion is tied to secrecy perhaps these groups’ cohesion can be weakened by 
tinkering with the relationship.  
One good example of this is the so called “Superman vs KKK” case documented 
in Freakonomics (Levitt and Dubner 2006: ch2) and more scholarly sources (Wade 
1987). By the 1940’s the Ku Klux Klan has become a notorious terrorist organization 
responsible for many violent politically-motivated crimes in the South. With a strong 
political base it was difficult to weaken the group. Stetson Kennedy, an investigative 
reporter, managed to infiltrate the Klan and familiarize himself with the group’s secret 
practices – its rituals, its costumes, titles, passwords, and secret jargon. He then shared 
the information with writers of a popular radio program called The Adventures of 
Superman. The writers penned an episode where Superman would battle the Klan, in 
the process revealing all the secret rituals, jargon, passwords, and customs as well as 
what they meant. After the airing of the episode, membership for new applications and 
attendance at meetings began to plummet. Levitt and Dubner explain this by the 
process of privately hoarded  information being made public and hence reducing 
demand – much like when terminal life insurance policy prices plummeted when 
internet comparison-shopping websites began to make price information more 
instantly accessible (Levitt and Dubner 2006:62). Another explanation is that the basis 
of cohesion of the Klan was undermined once the secrets were made public.  This is an 
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empirical question and one fruitful issue to investigate is this; once cohesion is 
established on the basis of secrecy – does it decline when the secrets is betrayed? 
Consider yet another case – that of the Red Brigades. In the 1970s Italy was 
rocked by a wave of terrorist attacks carried out by a Marxist organization, known as 
the Red Brigades (or Brigate Rosse). One of the strategies that proved successful in 
bringing down this organization was the so-called Repentence Laws (pentiti) (Moss 
2001).  The Repentance Laws were a series of laws that offered reduction in sentences 
or full amnesty to Red Brigade members who voluntarily turned themselves in, agreed 
to reveal locations of weapons caches, hideouts, and testify against former colleagues, 
as well as agreed to “repent” or permanently renounce violence and their former 
organization. The laws are credited in shattering the organization’s morale, triggering 
a cascade of division, and delivering the final blow to an already weakened 
organization. The same laws were later applied to the Cosa Nostra – the organized 
crime syndicates in Italy. Such efforts were far less successful. Mob members would 
game the policy by falsely accusing judges, prosecutors, or political opponents and 
were not as sensitive to betrayal by formerly loyal members41
                                                 
41 This was pointed out to me by Donatella della Porta, an authority on the Red Brigades (See Della 
Porta 1995) in a private conversation in the Summer of 2007.  
. Why the difference?  
Recall the theoretical distinction identified earlier between instrumental and moral 
cohesion. One possibility has to do with the goals of the two organizations. The Red 
Brigades were (primarily) interested in political goals, whereas the Cosa Nostra 
members were (primarily) interested in pecuniary goals. The cohesion of pecuniary 
groups is organized around exchange, whereas the cohesion of political groups is 
organized around ideology. A defection and denunciation by a colleague will be 
interpreted differently in the two groups. The pecuniary groups can rationalize the 
renunciation more easily as an example of a person just making a cost/benefit 
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calculation and exiting – no big deal.  The ideological groups and their supporters will 
have a much harder time rationalizing the defection of their brothers who were once 
zealously committed to the cause. Defection and renunciation in large numbers sends a 
much more serious signal which degrades the group’s legitimacy and is much more 
difficult to cope with. Furthermore, in an ideological group fighting for justice, 
principles matter. False accusations, a la mafia members, are viewed as outside the 
bounds of their code of honor.  One is not supposed to sink to the level of the “corrupt 
machine” one is fighting. For the mafia, corruption, framing, and betrayal are time-
tested methods to carry out the purpose of the organization.  
It may turn out that when information about terrorist organizations gets made 
public and becomes part of the mundane discourse, when the mystique is unraveled, 
commitment to the group may lessen among the remaining members.   
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CONCLUSION 
The sociological project to understand durable patterns of social relations can 
profit from the insight that oftentimes social relations are deliberately concealed. The 
implications of such concealment on the processes that are embedded in the social 
structure are profound.  Secrecy and concealment for non-instrumental reasons have 
been practiced by humans for millennia and continue to be practiced in modern society 
despite the emphasis on transparency, the lifting of taboos on the sharing of private 
information, and the widespread availability of information through electronic media 
such as the Internet. Georg Simmel was one of the first social theorists to realize that 
secret social structure matters. While secret relations may be a small part of modern 
life, they exert a disproportionate effect. Secrecy, Simmel said, “secures, so to speak, 
the possibility of a second world alongside the obvious world, and the later is most 
strenuously affected by the former” (Simmel 1906:462). 
In this study I have considered how the social psychological property of 
cohesion may be influenced by secrecy. While the results were not conclusive a new 
set of studies were suggested to improve the present design. I concluded by reviewing 
the theoretical and practical implications of continuing research on this important 
construct. I will end this paper by calling for nothing short than a full research 
program in the social psychology of secrecy.  
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APPENDICES 
 
APPENDIX A: CONSENT FORM 
 
 
Artistic Preference and Subjective Prioritization  
 
Please read this form carefully and ask any questions you may have before agreeing to 
take part in the study. 
 
What the study is about: The purpose of this study is to learn how artistic 
preferences relate to subjective prioritization.   
 
What we will ask you to do: The study will involve a set of tasks that we will ask 
you to perform first by yourself and then in a group. The tasks will involve selecting 
paintings, selecting a word, collaborating on a prioritization task, and answering some 
questions.  
 
Risks and benefits:  
There are no direct risks or benefits to you.  
 
Compensation: You may earn extra credit in a select course or receive $5 for your 
participation.  
 
Taking part is voluntary: Taking part in this study is completely voluntary. You may 
skip any questions that you do not want to answer. If you decide not to take part or to 
skip some of the questions, it will not affect your current or future relationship with 
Cornell University. If you decide to take part, you are free to withdraw at any time. 
 
Your answers will be confidential. The records of this study will be kept private. In 
any sort of report we make public we will not include any information that will make 
it possible to identify you. Only the researchers will have access to the records.  
 
If you have questions: The principle researcher conducting this study is Michael 
Genkin. Please ask any questions you have now. If you have questions later, you may 
contact Michael Genkin at mg324@cornell.edu.  If you have any questions or 
concerns regarding your rights as a subject in this study, you may contact the Cornell 
University Institutional Review Board at:  
 
Cornell University IRB 
395 Pine Tree Road, Suite 320 
Ithaca, NY 14850 
(607) 255-5138 
www.irb.cornell.edu 
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You will be given a copy of this form to keep for your records. 
 
Statement of Consent: I have read the above information, and have received answers 
to any questions I asked. I consent to take part in the study. 
Your Signature ___________________________________ Date _______________ 
 
 
  
67 
 
APPENDIX B: EXPERIMENTAL CONDITION SCRIPT (FOR THE KLEE-
KANDINSKY TASK) 
 
KLEE-KANDINSKY DET EXPERIMENTAL VERSION SCRIPT 
 
My name is Michael Genkin, I will be running the experiment today. _________  is my 
research assistant.   
 
Step 1: Creating a Group through the Dot-Estimation Task.  
Today you will be participating in a study concerned with how people develop 
quantitative judgments (in layman’s terms – how people count objects). Before we 
begin, I would like you to read over and sign the consent form for this experiment. In 
front of you are two copies, one is for us and one is for you to keep. Please turn the 
form over when you are finished.  
  
Do you have any questions about the consent form?  
 
Today you will be participating in a study concerned with how people make 
quantitative judgments (in layman’s terms – how people count objects). Past studies 
have shown that, given the task of estimating how many objects they have seen, 
different people tend to consistently overestimate or underestimate the correct 
number. While researchers  do not place any value judgments on whether it is better 
to be an overestimator or an underestimator, past research has shown that whether 
one is an overestimator or an underestimator does reveal something fundamental 
about the psychological characteristics and personality of the person. 
Different kinds of stimuli are used to detect a person's tendency toward over- or 
underestimation. One standard type of procedure is the Senton Dot Estimation 
Task, that we will be using today. It involves looking at a constellation of dots such 
as this [click slide] and estimating whether there are more small dots or large dots. 
Each slide will be displayed for exactly 2 seconds. Try to give your best approximation 
of how many dots are displayed.  
 
Run the slideshow.  
 
I will now collect the answer sheet and tabulate your scores.  
 
Collect the answer sheet and retreat behind the divider and pretend to tabulate the 
score. Randomly assign an artist to each group 
 
I have tabulated the scores and it looks like name 1 and name 2 clearly exhibit an 
overestimation tendency. It also looks that name 3 and name 4 exhibit a strong 
underestimation tendency. For the purposes of the experiment and to simplify the 
associated measures we are going to assign you into groups based on your 
quantitative  judgment tendency. So if the underestimator group can sit at this side of 
the table and the overestimator group can sit at this side of the table.   
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Step 2: Manipulating Secrecy  
We are now going to lead the two groups into a separate cubicle where you will be 
given special instructions.   
 
Lead the two pairs of participants to a separate cubicle and instruct them as follows: 
 
We are going to have you play a game with the other team. Part of the game involves 
coming up with a secret password that they (the other team) must not know. Please 
take a moment to come up with such a password and remember it. In addition, we 
would ask you to write down the password on this sheet and insert it into this manila 
envelope, which you will take with you as we join the other team members. Signal your 
completion by putting the “Finished” sign in the hanging wire basket on the side of 
the cubicle, over here [point].  
 
Step 3: Generating a Base-level of Cohesion  
Take two copies of LOM 
 
We will now ask you to consider the following task. Please read over the instructions 
and complete the task with your teammate.    
 
Hand out two copies of the Lost on the Moon task sheet.  
 
Put the “Finished” sign back, face down next to the participants. 
 
Once again, if you can signal your completion with the “Finished” sign.  
 
If I can have your answer sheet … and if you can please take a seat back at the table.  
 
Lead the participants back to the main room 
 
Step 4: Measuring Cohesion and Collecting Demographic Characteristics 
 
Before we proceed we will need you to fill out a brief questionnaire about your 
artistic preference group as a result of the Lost on the Moon task.  
 
Hand out the Cohesion Scale.  
Please signal your completion of the task by flipping the sheet over. 
 
Once subjects completed the cohesion scale: 
 
We are almost done.  However before I let you go, I would like you to fill out one last 
brief questionnaire. Again, if you can flip it over when you are finished.  
 
Once subjects completed the cohesion scale: 
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This concludes the experiment. Thank you for your participation; we would now like 
to debrief you as well as provide you with the promised reward.  
 
Ask subjects to leave the room individually. Experimenter provides compensation, 
checks suspicion, and debriefs subject 1. [One of the confederates does the same to 
subject 2 – for later].  
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
70 
 
APPENDIX C: CONTROL CONDITION SCRIPT (FOR THE KLEE-KANDINSKY 
TASK) 
 
KLEE-KANDINSKY CONTROL VERSION SCRIPT 
 
Hi, are you guys here for the experiment? Great, my name is _________, I will be 
running the experiment today. Please come this way.  
 
Step 1: Creating a Group through the Klee-Kandinsky Task.  
Today you will be participating in a study concerned with how people develop 
artistic judgments. Before we begin, I would like you to read over and sign the consent 
form for this experiment. In front of you are two copies, one is for us and one is for 
you to keep. Please turn the form over when you are finished.  
  
Do you have any questions about the consent form?  
 
Great, we will begin the study by giving you a booklet containing two pairs of 
drawings per page. Please take a moment to consider the two drawings and indicate 
the one you prefer on the answer sheet provided.  Please signal your completion of the 
task by flipping the booklet over like so. 
 
 
Illustrate the flipping over of the booklet. Hand the booklet and answer sheet to the 
participants 
 
The pairs of paintings you have just identified were actually drawn by two 20th 
century abstract painters Wassily Kandinsky and Paul Klee. While the paintings may 
appear similar in some respects, art historians have noted a very distinct style for 
each of the painters. Past studies by psychologists have shown that different people 
tend to consistently prefer one style over another.  While researchers do not place any 
value judgments on whether it is better to have a Klee preference or a Kandinsky 
preference, the  research has shown that these preferences reveal something 
fundamental about the psychological characteristics and personality of the person 
exhibiting the preference. These findings are very consistent and highly robust.  
 
I will now collect the answer sheet and tabulate your score, which will indicate your 
artistic preference. Please note and remember the number indicated on the top  of the 
form.  
 
Collect the answer sheet and retreat behind the divider and pretend to tabulate the 
score. Randomly assign an artist to each group 
 
I have tabulated the scores and it looks like name 1 and name 2 clearly exhibit a 
Kandinsky preference. It also looks that name 3 and name 4 exhibit a strong Klee 
preference. For the purposes of the experiment and to simplify the associated 
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measures we are going to assign you into groups based on your artistic preference. So 
if the Klee group can sit at this side of the table and the Kandinsky group can sit at 
this side of the table.   
 
Step 2: Manipulating Secrecy  
We are now going to lead the two groups into a separate cubicle where you will be 
given special instructions.   
 
Lead the two pairs of participants to a separate cubicle and instruct them as follows: 
 
We are going to have you play a game with the other team. Part of the game you will 
play with the other team involves coming up with a word, which you will show to the 
other team when you see them. Please take a moment to come up with such a word 
and remember it. In addition, we would ask you to write down the word on this sheet 
and insert it into this manila envelope, which you will take with you as we join the 
other team members. . Signal your completion by putting the “Finished” sign in the 
hanging wire basket on the side of the cubicle, over here [point].  
 
Step 3: Generating a Base-level of Cohesion  
Take two copies of LOM 
 
We will now ask you to consider the following task. Please read over the instructions 
and complete the task with your teammate.    
 
Hand out two copies of the Lost on the Moon task sheet.  
 
Put the “Finished” sign back, face down next to the participants.  
 
Once again, if you can signal your completion with the “Finished” sign.  
 
If I can have your answer sheet … and if you can please take a seat back at the table.  
 
Lead participants back to the main room, say: 
 
Please exchange the manila envelopes with the other team and observe each other’s 
words.  
 
Step 4: Measuring Cohesion and Collecting Demographic Characteristics 
 
Before we proceed we will need you to fill out a brief questionnaire about your 
artistic preference group as a result of the Lost on the Moon task.  
Hand out the Cohesion Scale.  
Please signal your completion of the task by flipping the sheet over. 
Once subjects completed the cohesion scale: 
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We are almost done.  However before I let you go, I would like you to fill out one last 
brief questionnaire. Again, if you can flip it over when you are finished.  
Once subjects completed the cohesion scale: 
 
This concludes the experiment. Thank you for your participation; we would now like 
to debrief you as well as provide you with the promised reward.  
 
Ask subjects to leave the room individually. Experimenter provides compensation, 
checks suspicion, and debriefs subject 1. [One of the confederates does the same to 
subject 2 – for later].  
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APPENDIX D: KLEE-KANDINSKY SLIDE 
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APPENDIX E: AN EXAMPLE OF THE DOT ESTIMATION SLIDES 
 
Slide 2
 
 
Slide 5
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APPENDIX F: LOST ON THE MOON (10-ITEM TASK) 
Lost on the Moon Task 
The Scenario- 
Your spaceship has just crashed on the moon. You were scheduled to rendezvous with 
a mother ship 200 miles away on the lighted surface of the moon, but the rough 
landing has ruined your ship and destroyed all the equipment on board except for the 
10 items listed below. 
Your crew’s survival depends on reaching the mother ship, so you must choose the 
most critical items available for the 200-mile trip. 
Your task is to rank the 10 items in terms of their importance for survival. Place a 
number 1 by the most important item, number 2 by the second most important, and so 
on, through number 10, the least important. 
______ Box of matches 
______ Food concentrate  
______ 50 feet of nylon rope  
______ Solar-powered portable heating unit 
______ Two .45caliber pistols 
______ Two 100-pound tanks of oxygen  
______ Stellar map (of the moon’s constellations)  
______ Magnetic compass 
______ 5 gallons of water  
______ Signal flares 
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APPENDIX G: PERCEIVED COHESION SCALE  
 
Questionnaire I 
Please circle the extent to which you agree/disagree with the following statements 
about your group: 
 
1. I feel that I belong to this group.  
strongly disagree…..quite….. slightly….. neither….. slightly….. quite….. strongly 
agree 
 
2. I am happy to be part of this group.  
strongly disagree…..quite….. slightly….. neither….. slightly….. quite….. strongly 
agree 
 
3. I see myself as part of this group.  
strongly disagree…..quite….. slightly….. neither….. slightly….. quite….. strongly 
agree 
 
4. This group is one of the best anywhere.  
strongly disagree…..quite….. slightly….. neither….. slightly….. quite….. strongly 
agree 
 
5. I feel that I am a member of this group.  
strongly disagree…..quite….. slightly….. neither….. slightly….. quite….. strongly 
agree 
 
6. I am content to be part of this group. 
strongly disagree…..quite….. slightly….. neither….. slightly….. quite….. strongly 
agree 
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APPENDIX H: PARTNER LIKEABILITY QUESTIONNAIRE 
QUESTIONAIRE III 
Directions 
Please circle the extent to which you agree/disagree with the following statements 
about your teammate. Use the following scale to record your answers. It is very 
important that you provide truthful answers. They will be kept confidential and will 
not be shared with your partner.  
     
 Strongly 
Disagree 
Quite 
Disagree 
Slightly 
Disagree 
Neither 
Agree/ 
Disagree 
Slightly 
Agree 
Quite 
Agree 
Strongly 
Agree 
1. I liked my 
teammate. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
2. I trusted 
my teammate.  
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
3. I was 
comfortable 
with my 
teammate.  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
4. My 
teammate 
dominated the 
interaction too 
much. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
5. I prefer not 
to interact with 
my teammate 
again. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
6. Interacting 
with my 
teammate 
made me 
uncomfortable.  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
7. I shared 
similarity with 
my teammate.  
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
8. I felt 
attracted to my 
teammate. 
       
9. My 
teammate was 
eccentric.  
       
10. My 
friends will 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
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probably like 
my teammate. 
11. My 
friends will 
probably trust 
my teammate. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
12. My 
friends will 
probably not 
enjoy 
interacting 
with my 
teammate. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
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APPENDIX I: POINT ALLOCATION TASK 
 
Point Allocation Task 
 
You have 100 points which you can allocate to the four participants in 
today’s study.  The points correspond to real money (at some ratio; all 
participants will receive actual money based on the allocations you make).   
Please make an allocation between the four persons. The total must sum 
to 100.  
 
 
Yourself:                                           _____ 
Person who is your teammate:         _____ 
Person sitting diagonally from you: _____ 
Person sitting opposite of you:         _____ 
TOTAL                                             100    .  
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APPENDIX J: DEMOGRAPHIC QUESTIONNAIRE  
 
Questionnaire II 
 
Please indicate the response that best describes you. All answers are confidential 
and anonymous – they are not matched to your name.  
 
I. Gender: 
___ Male  ___  Female 
 
 
II. Race: 
___ Caucasian/White ___ Black ___ Asian ___ Hispanic (of either race) 
   ___ Multiracial 
 
 
III. Current Year Status: 
Freshman______       Sophomore______      Junior______      Senior______     
 Other______ 
 
 
IV. What is your major/area of study? ______________________ 
 
 
V. Parent’s household income?  
___   Under $10,000     ___ $10,000 - $19,999     ___ $20,000 - $29,999 
___$30,000 - $39,999  ___ $40,000 - $49,999     ___ $50,000 - $74,999 
___$75,000 - $99,999  ___$100,000 - $150,000  ___  Over $150,000 
 
 
VI. Age: 
                _____ 
 
 
VII. Home state: 
_____ or  _____ - does not apply, I am an international student 
 
 
VIII. If you are an international student, which country are you from?  
       ______________ 
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